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ABSTRACT
A Computational Framework for Dam Safety Risk Assessment with
Uncertainty Analysis
by
Anurag Srivastava, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. David S. Bowles
Department: Civil and Environmental Engineering
The growing application of risk analysis in dam safety, especially for the owners
of large numbers of dams (e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), has motivated the
development of a new tool (DAMRAE) for event tree based dam safety risk analysis.
Various theoretical challenges were overcome in formulating the computational
framework of DAMRAE and several new computational concepts were introduced. The
concepts of Connectivity and Pedigree matrices are proposed to quantify the user-drawn
event tree structures with proper accounting of interdependencies among the event tree
branches. A generic calculation of Common-Cause Adjustment for the non-mutually
exclusive failure modes is implemented along with introducing the new concepts of
system response probability and consequence freezing. New output presentation formats
such as cumulative risk estimate vs. initiating variable plots to analyze the increase of an
incremental (annualized) risk estimate as a function of initiating variable are introduced.
An additional consideration is given to the non-breach risk estimates in the risk modeling
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and new output formats such as non-breach F-N and F-$ charts are included as risk
analysis outputs.
DAMRAE, a Visual Basic.NET based framework, provides a convenient platform
to structure the risk assessment of a dam in its existing state and for alternatives or
various stages of implementing a risk reduction plan. The second chapter of the
dissertation presents the architectural framework of DAMRAE and describes the
underlying theoretical and computational logic employed in the software. An example
risk assessment is presented in the third chapter to demonstrate the DAMRAE
functionalities.
In the fourth chapter, the DAMRAE framework is extended into DAMRAE-U to
incorporate uncertainty analysis functionality. Various aspects and requirements
reviewed for uncertainty analysis in the context of dam safety risk assessment and
theoretical challenges overcome to develop the computational framework for DAMRAEU are described in this chapter. The capabilities of DAMRAE-U are illustrated in the fifth
chapter, which contains an example dam safety risk assessment with uncertainty analysis.
The dissertation concludes with a summary of DAMRAE features and recommendations
for further work in the sixth chapter.
(157 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
A Computational Framework for Dam Safety Risk Assessment with
Uncertainty Analysis
by
Anurag Srivastava, Doctor of Philosophy
Event tree analysis is a commonly-used method in dam safety risk analysis. Event
trees are used to obtain quantitative estimates of the probability of dam failure and its
associated consequences. This can be done to evaluate the safety of an existing dam or to
provide insights into the choice between risk reduction alternatives. In the past, the
calculations have been performed using either generalized software developed primarily
for business applications or purpose-built spreadsheets. However, these approaches lack
generality, can require substantial effort, can be fragile, and are difficult to modify to
represent risk reduction measures or to update using new information from investigations.
These limitations can lead to using event tree structures that do not properly represent the
failure modes and poor numerical precision in risk estimates. To overcome these
limitations, the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) sponsored the development of a
computational framework for efficient, flexible and generalized event tree analysis called
DAMRAE (DAM safety Risk Analysis Engine). DAMRAE is now being used by the
USACE and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) while continued development takes
place at Utah State University.
The supporting research and development of DAMRAE was carried in two stages.
First, a deterministic (or non-stochastic) version was formulated and developed and then,
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uncertainty analysis functionality was formulated and included. DAMRAE includes a
graphical user interface (GUI) for developing and populating event tree inputs and
functionalities for calculating and post-processing results. It provides estimates of the
probabilities of various failure modes and their associated consequences for an existing
dam. The post-processing step allows the user to combine results for various loading
types (e.g. flood and earthquake) and to make comparisons against USACE tolerable risk
guidelines. It can be applied to analyze structural and non-structural risk reduction
measures, considered as alternatives or staged measures, including obtaining estimates of
the risk reduction and the cost effectiveness of risk reduction.
Various theoretical challenges were overcome in formulating the computational
framework of DAMRAE and new computational concepts were introduced.

These

include: Connectivity and Pedigree matrices to quantify the user-drawn event tree
structures; Common-Cause Adjustment for the non-mutually exclusive failure modes
along with the new concepts of system response probability and consequences freezing;
and separation of uncertainties in logic and event trees. Several new output presentation
formats including the tolerable risk evaluation under uncertainty were introduced as risk
analysis outputs.
The developed computational framework was extensively verified using several
risk analyses performed by USACE and by Dr. David S. Bowles and his group.
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DEDICATION
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1. Risk analysis in dam safety
In the context of dam safety, risk analysis integrates the scientific and dam
engineering principles, the experience and judgment of dam safety professionals, with
probability theory and mathematical statistics to obtain qualitative insights and
quantitative estimates of the risk of dam failure. These outcomes can be obtained for a
dam in its existing condition and for a range of risk reduction alternatives to explore
equitable, efficient and reasonably practical resource allocations for structural safety, and
operational and emergency planning to improve the safety of persons, property and the
environment that are at risk from dam failure. Risk analysis, which involves both the risk
identification and risk estimation, is embedded within a structured framework of dam
safety risk assessment and risk management [1, 2].
The process of dam safety risk analysis is commenced with a defined scope and
context for the risk assessment. A well-defined scope helps in setting the level of
sophistication and rigor in the analysis efforts to optimize the use of the available study
resources (e.g., human skills, time, and technical capabilities) and to achieve adequate
outputs for the decision making purpose. The scope and context of risk analysis must
originate mainly with the decision-maker(s), including various stakeholders in the
decision process; although it is often necessary for the risk analysts to be involved to
ensure that this critical initial step is clearly and thoroughly completed. Outcomes from
this initial step should include a list of all types of outputs that will be needed as inputs to
the decision processes that will be informed by the risk assessment, and a list of all life

2
safety tolerable risk guidelines and other types of criteria or guidelines against which risk
estimates will be evaluated. An understanding of the context will also help to identify
who the decision makers are and the extent to which other stakeholders are to be
included. Stakeholders can include a dam safety regulator, an economic regulator, costshare partners, water users, environmental groups, and downstream (and sometimes
upstream) populations at risk.
Based on the identified purpose and context for the analysis, event tree forms of
risk models are set up to delineate the “source-pathway-receptor” scenarios of the
analysis, and the quantification efforts are put forth to obtain inputs and risk estimates. In
the deterministic form of the analysis, knowledge uncertainties associated with various
events are either ignored and reasonable best estimates, as judged by subject matter
experts, are used to assign the inputs, or a deliberately conservative position may be taken
in estimating inputs in the case of a screening risk assessment, for example. An
uncertainty analysis approach can be used in risk analysis to explicitly characterize the
knowledge uncertainties in the event tree model inputs and to obtain the uncertainty
distributions of the risk estimates. “Uncertainty analysis provides an enhanced way to
present the outcomes of risk assessment to decision makers by including estimates of the
level of confidence in risk assessment outcomes based on uncertainty in risk analysis
inputs” [3].
Risk estimates obtained for the baseline analysis of the dam in its existing
condition are evaluated against tolerable risk and other guidelines as part of the process
of formulating decision recommendations regarding the following:
a) The need to conduct further investigations to better understand and reduce
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uncertainties about apparently significant dam safety issues;
b) To explore, or not to explore, risk reduction options; or
c) To strengthen various aspects of on-going dam safety management activities.
When uncertainty analyses are conducted the evaluation against tolerable risk
limit guidelines is changed from a relatively straightforward assessment as to whether
risk estimates are above or below limit guidelines to an assessment of the degree of
confidence that the estimated risk is above or below a limit guideline. Such evaluations
should also consider the limitations in the analysis and the extent to which any key
variables were not included in the analysis.
Tolerable risk guidelines (TRG) for dam safety have been developed by various
organizations. Typically, in countries with a common law legal system, these guidelines
follow a two-part evaluation process as established by the UK Health and Safety
Executive [4]. The first part compares total estimated risk for all failure modes against
the tolerable risk limits for Individual Risk (IR) expressed as a probability of life loss for
the identifiable person(s) most at risk and for Societal Risk (SR) expressed as a limit of
tolerability line on a cumulative probability distribution (F-N chart) of exceeding various
magnitudes of (random) life loss as a measure of life-safety risk. Variations of TRGs
used for dam safety also consider tolerable risk limits for Annual Probability of Failure
(APF) as a measure of the performance of the dam and Annualized Life Loss (ALL) as
the average magnitude of life loss from the probability distribution of life loss for
Societal Risk.
The second part of the risk evaluation process is a determination of whether risks
have been reduced to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). To conduct an
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ALARP evaluation requires that practical options for reducing the risk through structural
and non-structural means are identified and evaluated. This evaluation is both qualitative
and quantitative in nature and typically, it should take the following into account [5]:
a) The level of risk in relation to the tolerable risk limits,
b) The disproportion between the sacrifice (money, time, trouble and effort) in
implementing the risk-reduction measures and the subsequent risk reduction
achieved,
c) The cost-effectiveness of the risk-reduction measures,
d) Compliance with established good dam safety practice, and
e) Societal concerns as revealed by consultation with the community and other
stakeholders.
The consideration of the cost effectiveness or “disproportionality” associated with
the cost of achieving life-safety risk reduction relative to the life-safety benefit achieved
is a quantitative aspect of an ALARP evaluation. This introduces the consideration of
cost, but only to justify further incremental risk reduction below the tolerable risk limits,
and not to justify achieving those limits in the first place. Hence, there is normally no
consideration of “balancing” the economic impacts of operating restrictions and
reductions in life-safety risk in meeting the tolerable risk limits.
In a risk reduction analysis, the entire risk and uncertainty analysis is reiterated,
with changed values of event tree branch variables and their uncertainty specifications to
represent a proposed risk reduction plan, and possibly with a modified event tree
structure if needed to represent the risk reduction measures. Some types of uncertainties
about the dam system performance may be significantly reduced or perhaps eliminated by

5
engineering out certain failure modes in conjunction with the opportunity to exercise a
high level of quality control during construction of a risk reduction measure and also with
the possibility of more fully exploring foundation conditions during the remedial
construction process. The residual risk estimates are then evaluated against the tolerable
risk limit guidelines and other guidelines and a level-2 TRG evaluation is conducted
considering the degree to which ALARP consideration are satisfied. Based on these
evaluations and the engineering and other understandings that are typically strengthened
through the risk and uncertainty analysis process, decision recommendations are made by
the risk analysis team, together with the supporting case for these recommendations, and
passed onto decision makers.
In preparation for conducting an uncertainty analysis, it is useful to perform
sensitivity analyses on a preliminary deterministic event tree model as part of the process
of selecting which input variables to treat as uncertain variables and which are
appropriately considered as deterministic variables. Where there is little sensitivity of all
key decision (output) variables to changing an input variable across the entire range of
uncertainty associated with its magnitude, then that variable can be treated as a
deterministic variable although interactions with other variables should be carefully
considered. By minimizing the number of variables that are treated as uncertainty
variables the computational time needed to complete uncertainty analyses can be kept to
a minimum.
It may also be valuable to perform uncertainty reduction analyses to explore the
potential value of conducting investigations that are designed to better understand
existing conditions or key parameters that affect apparently significant dam safety issues.
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2. Research objectives
The objectives of this dissertation work are outlined in Figure 1.1. The
dissertation work is oriented to provide a comprehensive analytical tool to efficiently
address the practical aspects of risk analysis specific to dam safety. The surging
acceptance of formal risk analysis in dam safety and the emerging requirements of
portfolio risk assessment from the owners of many dams, such as the US Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE), have motivated the development of this new software for event tree
based dam safety risk assessment - first, to overcome the limitations of commercial
riskwares, and second, to serve the requirements of a database-compatible computational
core engine in a portfolio risk assessment and management system.
DAMRAE is developed using the Visual Basic.NET environment. In addition to

Literature Review:

Uncertainty Analysis

DAMRAE-U

DAMRAE
Generalized
Event Tree
Algorithm

Literature Review:

• Design a structured framework to
incorporate an existing case risk
model and various risk reduction
measures
• Develop a GUI based analytical tool
to
o Draw and quantify the risk
models
o Generate the USACE tolerable
risk guidelines charts
o Obtain
the
economic
evaluation
and
decision
justification estimates for risk
reduction measures
• Software verification and validation

Monte Carlo Simulation
• Define an uncertainty analysis
classification structure for dam
safety risk analysis
• Conceptualize
the
uncertainty
analysis framework in context of
dam safety
• Extend the DAMRAE framework to
develop a generic analytical tool for
Monte Carlo based uncertainty
analysis in dam safety risk models
• Software verification and validation
using existing risk model
• Software application to various risk
models
• Software documentation

Risk Analysis
Figure 1.1. Research objectives

Event Tree Analysis

7
the very significant challenges of designing and programming the DAMRAE software for
dam safety risk assessment, some significant conceptual issues were addressed which
represent specific contributions of this work, as followsa)

Refinements to the evolving risk analysis modeling framework were made to
develop a generic tool that is suited to dam safety risk analysis.

b)

The concepts of Connectivity and Pedigree matrices are introduced to
quantify the user drawn event tree structures with proper accounting of
interdependencies among the event tree branches.

c)

System response probability (SRP) and consequence freezing concepts are
introduced along with a generic implementation of the Common-Cause
Adjustment (CCA) for the non-mutually exclusive failure modes.

d)

Non-breach risk estimates are included as standard risk analysis outputs.

e)

New output presentation formats, e.g. cumulative risk estimate vs. initiating
variable plots are introduced.

f)

Monte Carlo simulation based generic computational logic for uncertainty
separation is introduced with the consideration of correlations among
uncertain variables.

g)

Computational logic of uncertainty analysis for risk reduction measures is
implemented.

h)

New output presentation formats incorporating uncertainty are introduced
for the tolerable risk guidelines evaluations.

The research work was pursued in two stages. In the first stage, a review of dam
safety risk analysis literature was completed to investigate and formulate the conceptual
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design for DAMRAE in a deterministic mode, that is, without uncertainty analysis. The
formulated conceptual design was implemented to develop DAMRAE as a GUI-based
user-friendly computational tool. The results from several existing risk analysis studies,
which were performed using spreadsheet calculations, were replicated to verify the
DAMRAE software. Several hypothetical risk models were set up to demonstrate the
application capabilities of the new DAMRAE software. Based on the work of the first
stage, the following two research papers were prepared and included in this dissertation
as Chapters 2 and 3, respectively: 1) DAMRAE - A Computational Framework for Event
Tree Based Dam Safety Risk Analysis; and 2) DAMRAE - Application for an Example
Dam Safety Risk Assessment.
In the second stage, the DAMRAE framework was extended to incorporate
uncertainty analysis. A literature review of uncertainty analysis and Monte Carlo
simulation were performed to understand the state of the art. A generic conceptual
framework for uncertainty analysis for dam safety risk analysis was proposed and
implemented in the DAMRAE-U software. Based on the work of the second stage, the
following two research papers were prepared and included in this dissertation as Chapters
4 and 5, respectively: 1) Uncertainty in Dam Safety Risk Assessment: Theoretical
Concepts and A Developed Framework with the description of the conceptual and
computational concepts of DAMRAE-U; and 2) DAMRAE-U Application for an
Example Dam Safety Risk Assessment with Uncertainty Analysis as an illustrative
example of risk assessment with uncertainty analysis.
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CHAPTER 2
DAMRAE: A COMPUTATION FRAMEWORK FOR EVENT TREE BASED DAM
SAFETY RISK ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT
Although several risk analysis tools are available commercially, there is still a
lack of generic software that can efficiently address the specific requirements of dam
safety risk analysis. The surging acceptance of formal risk analysis in dam safety and the
emerging requirements of portfolio risk assessment from the owners of large numbers of
dam (e.g., USACE) have motivated the development of a new software for event tree
based dam safety risk analysis, which can overcome the limitations of commercial
riskwares and can serve as a database-compatible computational core engine in dam
safety portfolio risk assessment and management systems. This paper presents the
architectural framework of this new software and describes the underlying theoretical and
computational logic employed in the software.

1. Introduction
The long-established science of risk analysis has been adapted for application in
the field of dam safety management. In the context of dam safety, risk analysis integrates
the scientific and dam engineering principles, the experience and judgment of dam safety
professionals, and probability theory and mathematical statistics to obtain qualitative
insights and quantitative estimates of the risk of dam failure. These outcomes can be
obtained for a dam in its existing condition and for a range of risk-reduction alternatives
to explore equitable, efficient and reasonably-practicable resource allocations for
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structural safety, and operational and emergency planning to improve the safety of
people, property and the environment that are at risk from dam failure. Risk analysis,
which includes both risk identification and risk estimation, and risk evaluation comprise
risk assessment, which can be embedded within a structured framework for dam safety
risk management [1, 2]. Risk Assessment (RA) of individual dams can be incorporated in
a systematic approach of Portfolio Risk Assessment (PRA) to serve as a decision-support
tool for Portfolio Risk Management (PRM) to provide an improved management scheme
for the owner’s entire dam safety management program [3]. RA combined with
traditional engineering standards evaluations forms a risk-informed approach [4]. The
accumulated experience of almost three decades of experience with applying risk analysis
to dam safety problems have guided the evolutionary process from single dam RA to
PRA to the integrated PRM framework with risk analysis at the core of the framework.
Along with theoretical advances, developments in computer-aided technical
resources and computational methods have contributed to incorporating PRM at the
enterprise level. Various dam owners and agencies are now seeking computer-supported
risk assessment and management tools. These tools help to architect a comprehensive
Management Information System (MIS) to fulfill the organizational requirements of
analysis, notification, updates, reports and planning dam safety activities among
engineers and decision-makers [3, 5]. ResRisk, a portfolio risk management tool
developed by Utah State University and RAC Engineers & Economists for a large UK
dam owner [6], and PAMS (Performance-based Asset Management System) developed
for the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and Environmental
Agency [7] for flood risk management in the UK are prime examples of such endeavors.
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There are numerous commercially-available riskwares that could provide risk
analysis engine functionality to these management systems [8], but generally, these
proprietary riskwares are developed for business applications and lack the features
needed for dam safety applications, with the result that substantial effort is required to
apply them to dam safety risk assessments. Some of the drawbacks of these riskwares, in
context of dam safety risk analysis, are as follows:
i.

Inefficient modeling features: Event trees are the most commonly used risk
models in dam safety risk assessment [1]. Most software tools provide userfriendly features to construct event tree diagrams; however they lack the
convenience of including continuous initiating events such as needed to
represent flood and earthquake loading as annual exceedance probability
distributions. To achieve numerical precision in risk estimates numerous
identical event trees must be constructed to cover a wide range of loading
values and this is a tedious and highly repetitive task. In addition, the resulting
event tree diagrams can be difficult to readily understand and cumbersome to
modify, which can discourage making changes that are needed to adequately
represent failure modes or for addressing a full range of sensitivity cases in a
risk assessment.

ii.

Inadequate calculation options: Most of these tools lack the capability to
readily assign branch probabilities and consequences to the numerous event
tree branches and for considering the interdependencies among the variables
in the event tree. Also, variable step size, which is desirable for continuous
events to achieve numerical precision, and a common-cause adjustment [9,
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10] to properly treat non-mutually exclusive events are not available options
in these software.1
iii.

Insufficient analysis outputs: Typically, output from these riskwares is
available only as expected values or annualized estimates of risks, with poor
flexibility to obtain breakdowns of total risk estimates by failure modes or
exposure scenarios, for example. There is also often no straightforward way to
track and obtain probability-consequence pairs with their associated state
values to prepare graphical displays for the evaluation of tolerable risk
guidelines, such as those used by ANCOLD [11], NSW DSC [12],
Reclamation [13], and USACE [14].

iv.

Incompatibility with custom database: The input-output format of these
riskwares is not designed in a compatible configuration to link with a specific
custom database or to serve as a core engine in a dam safety portfolio
management information system. Other requirements such as the modelreusability (i.e., the reuse of the same event tree model structure or input
modifications for risk reduction measures and sensitivity studies), model
scalability (i.e., developing a more-detailed model from a less-detailed
preliminary model), automated batch processing (e.g., for long dams,
uncertainty analysis applications, or automated model verification) and

1

The common cause adjustment (CCA) is an approach to adjust the conditional
probabilities for the failure modes that are not mutually exclusive. The non-mutually
exclusive failure modes, also referred as common cause failure modes, are failure modes
that can occur simultaneously at a single dam section or at multiple sections of a dam due
to a single initiating event. In the context of dam risk analysis, either the uni-modal
bounds theorem or the physical dominance approach is used for the CCA. The reader is
referred to Section 3.2 and Bowles et al. [9] for a detailed description on the CCA.
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obtaining risk reduction estimates are at best awkward and in many cases
infeasible in the available riskwares. To attempt to adapt existing riskwares is
thwart with problems of software incompatibility or requirements for
necessary software modifications and adjustments, which brings in additional
complexity of computer coding, source code availability, programming
environment compatibility, etc.
Therefore, although most of the riskwares offer the flexibility needed for
applications of risk analysis in some fields [8], they have severe limitations for
application to dam safety risk analysis. These limitations have led to using oversimplified risk model structures and to obtaining poor numerical precision in risk
estimates. To overcome these limitations, the USACE has sponsored our development of
a generic risk analysis tool – DAMRAE (DAM safety Risk Analysis Engine). The
DAMRAE concept is founded on a generalized event tree analysis algorithm and its
overall design is formulated to serve the requirements of dam safety risk assessment and
risk management.
This paper presents the architecture of the DAMRAE framework including the
underlying computational algorithm for the event tree analysis. Brief introductions of
dam risk analysis and event tree analysis are included in subsections 1.1 and 1.2,
respectively. The overall DAMRAE framework, associated generalized event tree
algorithm, and framework outputs are described in sections 2, 3 and 4, respectively. A
summary of the unique contributions of this work are presented in section 5 and section 6
contains some concluding remarks.
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1.1. Dam safety risk analysis
The process of dam risk analysis should always commence with a defined scope
and identified context for the risk assessment. A well-defined scope is important in
setting an appropriate level of sophistication and rigor for the analysis effort and to
achieve the desired outputs for use in supporting the identified decision-making purposes.
The risk analysis process includes risk identification including identification of
the dam system scope, loading types, failure modes, exposure scenarios and
consequences, risk model development, and risk model quantification. The risk analysis
is initially conducted on the current baseline or existing condition of the dam system and
can be used to evaluate risk reduction measures that can be structural (e.g., raise dam
crest elevation, increase spillway capacity, or add a stability berm and filter) or nonstructural (e.g., increase warning time, enhance evacuation planning, or implement a
reservoir operating restriction) in nature. Individual risk reduction measures are
combined into risk reduction plans and evaluated as alternatives or for staged
implementation. On the other hand, each risk analysis performed for a baseline or a risk
reduction state can be updated with improved inputs based on completing investigations
or analyses that are designed to reduce the knowledge uncertainty in the inputs and hence
to justify greater confidence in the risks assessment outcomes.
Initially, a more simplified risk analysis may be performed for a screening
purpose, such as when initiating a portfolio risk management (PRM) program for a group
of dams belonging to the same owner. One of the purposes of PRM is usually to develop
and maintain a defensible basis for iteratively improving risk and uncertainty reduction
pathways to efficiently allocate limited resources [15]. Though there is a tendency to

16
adopt a simple and unified risk analysis model structure in support of an initial portfolio
risk assessment, it is important to realize the limitations of such an approach and to scale
up the model to a more a detailed model structure if needed to achieve adequate
confidence in risk estimates to support final risk reduction alternatives selection or other
detailed design choices. The portfolio risk assessment approach can be incorporated in a
portfolio risk management information system as a decision-support tool [3]. Such a
system can be centered on a database with other inputs, modeling, and reporting tools to
collectively form a systematic and streamlined means of supporting dam safety
management decisions for an entire portfolio of dams. The risk analysis engine is an
essential component of such a system and can be run to support the evaluation of
management options.
1.2. Event tree analysis (ETA)
Dam risk analysis is commonly based on event tree models for qualitative
representation and quantitative assessment of the safety of the dam-reservoir system and
to associate consequences with system performance. In general, an event tree is a
graphical and mathematical model that is used to represent cause-and-effect (or eventoutcome-consequence) relationships in a complex system, where, often, but not
necessarily, relationships are arranged in a temporal sequence. Branch levels in the event
tree can represent combinations of quantifiable intermediate events, such as the dynamic
response of a dam-foundation system to an earthquake including the effects of
liquefaction as modeled using FLAC [16] or a similar model.
The events forming the first level or the beginning of an event tree are referred to
as Initiating Events. Each event in an event tree is represented by a branch dividing
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further into as many branches as outcomes in the corresponding event-outcome space
[17]. In the context of dam safety, initiating events are usually some type of annual peak
loading event. For example for floods attributes such as peak annual inflow or peak
annual reservoir pool elevation vs. annual exceedance probability (AEP) are often used.
For seismic events the earthquake loading may be characterized as peak (annual) ground
acceleration (PGA) vs. AEP either disaggregated over earthquake magnitude ranges or
totaled over all magnitude ranges depending on whether magnitude in addition to PGA
needs to be considered to characterize system performance.
The specific attributes of the initiating or loading events should be determined
based on those needed to represent the likelihood of different dam system failure modes
occurring over the entire range of loading variables. The failure modes leading to a dam
breach outcome may be represented by one or more levels of branches following the
initiating event branches. The event tree may be extended to represent consequences,
including economic and life loss at remote locations from the dam due to dam break
flooding.
The inputs to event tree branches are estimated from a combination of many
sources of evidence including the following: available site-specific historical data (such
as for flood or earthquake frequency curves); traditional and customized structural and
other reliability analysis methods for structural (system) response probabilities; statistical,
semi-empirical and simulation models (e.g. for estimation of dam failure consequences
[17]); and expert elicitation based on professional knowledge, experience and judgment
[18].
ETA is a well-established modeling approach in risk analysis systems. In any
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field, the probability assignments and quantification involved in ETA follows the general
concept of probability theory; however, the design or layout of event tree structure is siteand problem- specific. A conceptual article by Papazoglou [19] describes the
mathematical foundation of event trees and proposes automated algorithms for event tree
construction and some general simplifications. Many examples exist of event trees for
dam safety risk analysis applications [15, 20-23].
Dams are complex systems that are located in unique settings. While some failure
modes, such as failure induced by overtopping during a very extreme flood, are common
to many dams, others are a unique result of the design and construction details and their
relationship to the geological setting. Therefore event tree construction cannot be
generalized or automated but must be the result of the analyst capturing the essential
characteristics of system performance in relation to the external loading events or internal
flaws that may exist in the structure. The initial conceptualization of an event tree is a
result of the understanding, experience and knowledge of the analyst, or the team that is
involved in the risk assessment, and should be tailored for the scope and context in which
the risk assessment is conducted.
Event tree analysis can be divided into the following phases: i) construction, ii)
quantification, and iii) post-processing and reporting. This paper describes a generalized
systematic approach to support these three phases of ETA in the context of dam safety
risk assessment.
1.3. USACE tolerable risk guidelines
The USACE tolerable risk guidelines [14] are incorporated in DAMRAE to evaluate
the significance of the estimated risks for the Baseline case and for risk reduction
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measures. These guidelines include a two-part evaluation process. In the first part the
total estimated risk for all failure modes is compared against the following USACE
tolerable risk “limit values”:
a) An Annual Probability of Failure (APF) limit value of 1 in 10,000 /year as a
measure of the performance of the dam (see the horizontal limit line at 1 in 10,000
/year on Figure 2.1).
b)

An Individual Risk (IR) limit value 1 in 10,000 /year as a measure of life-safety
risk expressed as the probability of life loss for the identifiable person(s) most at
risk (see the point at 1 in 10,000 /year on Figure 2.2).

c)

A Societal Risk (SR) expressed as a limit of tolerability on a cumulative
probability distribution (F-N chart) of exceeding various magnitudes of life loss
as a measure of life-safety risk to non-identifiable or random persons (see the

f- N Chart
1.E-02

Annual Probability of Failure , f (/year)

1 life/yr
1.E-03

0.1 life/yr

1 in
10,000 /yr

1.E-04

0.01 life/yr
1.E-05

0.001 life/yr
1.E-06

1.E-07

1.E-08
1

10

100

1,000

Average Life Loss Estimate, N

Figure 2.1. f-N charts showing USACE APF and ALL tolerable risk limit guidelines
(where N = weighted average annual life loss estimated as ALL/APF)
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guideline for existing dams
[14]

10000

Figure 2.3. F-N chart showing USACE
societal risk limit guideline
for existing dams [14]

sloping and vertical limit lines on Figure 2.3).
d)

An Annualized Life Loss (ALL) of 0.001 lives/year as the average magnitude of
life loss from the probability distribution of life loss in 3) as an average measure
of societal life-safety risk (see the sloping limit line at 0.001 lives/year on Figure
2.1).
The second part of the risk evaluation process is a determination of whether risks

have been reduced to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). This evaluation is
both qualitative and quantitative in nature and should take the following into account: the
level of risk in relation to the tolerable risk limits; the disproportion between the sacrifice
(money, time, trouble and effort) in implementing the risk reduction measures and the
subsequent risk reduction achieved; the cost-effectiveness of the risk reduction measures;
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compliance with essential USACE guidelines; and societal concerns as revealed by
consultation with the community and other stakeholders.
The consideration of the cost effectiveness or “disproportionality” associated with
the cost of achieving life-safety risk reduction relative to the life-safety benefit achieved
is a quantitative aspect of an ALARP evaluation and is included in DAMRAE. This
introduces the consideration of cost, but only to justify further incremental risk reduction
below the tolerable risk limits, and not to justify achieving those limits in the first place.
Hence, there should be no consideration of “balancing” the economic impacts of
operating restrictions and reductions in life-safety risk in meeting the tolerable risk limits.

2. DAMRAE framework
DAMRAE is a graphical user interface (GUI) based analytical framework for dam
safety risk analysis. Figure 2.4 shows the main interface of DAMRAE. The analytical

Figure 2.4. DAMRAE main interface
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architecture includes the following three objects, i) DAMRAE Project, ii) Run Case, and
iii) Event Tree (ET), arranged in a tiered system as shown in Figure 2.5.
A DAMRAE project is a risk analysis project for a single dam and it comprises
one or more run cases. A run case represents a safety state of a dam and the scope of the
run cases in a project is determined by the user, but could, for example, be for a dam in
its existing condition and a proposed series of risk reduction measures to be implemented
in a staged manner. Any proposed structural modification to the dam structure or its
appurtenances or non-structural actions that reduce the failure probability or the
probability or consequences of failure is referred to as a risk reduction measure (RRM).
Combinations of RRMs are referred to as a Risk Reduction Plan (RRP). The following
four types of run cases are illustrated in Figure 2.6 and are defined in DAMRAE as
follows:
i.

Initial Stage: A new DAMRAE project begins with an Initial Stage, which

DAMRAE Project
Run Case 1
…
Run Case n

Event Tree(s)
Calculation Options
1. Base Run
Calculation

2. Without Commoncause
Adjustment
Sensitivity

Summary Table and Plots including evaluations against
USACE tolerable risk guidelines

Figure 2.5. DAMRAE framework
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Initial Stage
SS 0S1
Alternatives
RRA 0.1
Stages

RRS 1

SS 0.1S1

RRA 0.2
SS 0.2S1

SS 1S1
Alternatives
RRS 2
SS 2S1

RRA 1.1
SS 1.1S1

RRA 1.2
SS 1.2S1

Figure 2.6. Run cases defined in DAMRAE (RRS = Risk Reduction Stage, RRA =
Risk Reduction Alternative, and SS = Sensitivity State)
typically represents the current or an historical safety state of a dam.
ii.

Risk Reduction Stage (RRS): The safety state of a dam following
implementation of a proposed risk reduction measure (RAM) is
represented by a risk reduction stage. Incremental risk reduction and
benefits for a RRS are estimated with reference to the preceding safety
state, which could be an Initial Stage or a previous RRS, and which is also
referred to as the baseline state for the RRS.

iii.

Risk Reduction Alternative (RRA): A run case representing an
alternative risk reduction measure for a safety state (i.e. Initial Stage or an
RRS) is referred to as a risk reduction alternative. Multiple risk reduction
alternatives can be included in a DAMRAE project following any safety
state. For each alternative the incremental risk reduction and benefits are
calculated with respect to the previous safety state, which is referred to as
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its baseline state.
iv.

Sensitivity Safety State (S): The effect of changes in the event tree
structure and inputs can be studied by defining Sensitivity Safety States in
the project. Any number of sensitivity safety states can be included. Each
safety state is associated with a base safety state which can be an Initial
State, RRS or RRA. Changes in risk estimates for each sensitivity safety
state are calculated with reference to its respective base safety state.2

A run case can combine contributions to total dam failure risk from more than one
loading type, each represented in a separate event Tree. Examples of event trees that may
be included within a run case could be, for example, winter and summer season flood
loading cases [20], or different ranges of earthquake magnitude for earthquake loading
[23]. An event tree (ET) object, which is the inner-most object in the DAMRAE
framework, holds the user-drawn graphical representation of the event tree and associated
event tree inputs. The ET object is integrated with a generalized event tree algorithm
(described in the following section 3) to perform the event tree calculation for the
following two options: a) Base Run Calculation, and b) Without Common-Cause
Adjustment Sensitivity. The sensitivity calculation option b) can be selected for any run
case and should not be confused with the Sensitivity Safety State (S).

2

The “base” and “baseline” safety states are different. The base safety state refers to the
same safety state as a sensitivity run is made for with the difference being that the base
run uses “base” input values and the sensitivity runs uses deviations from these base
values. Sensitivity run risk estimates are compared with the base run estimates to assess
the degree of sensitivity. The baseline safety state refers to the previous safety state
against which risk reduction is calculated.
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3. Event tree algorithm
A generalized algorithm to transform the user-drawn event tree structure into a
matrix format and expand the matrix to cover the range of loading intervals is a key
element in the DAMRAE computational approach. The matrix format is used as the basis
for performing the event tree calculation by which quantitative risk estimates are
obtained. We have also made some refinements to the traditional ETA terminology to
tailor this generalized algorithm to dam safety risk analysis. The details are discussed
under the stages of event tree analysis in the following subsections.
3.1. Event tree construction and input assignment
Probabilistic risk assessment of a dam system is commonly based on the event
tree form of risk model. The generalized computational framework of DAMRAE
supports the deterministic form of event tree calculations. The word ‘deterministic’ is
used in the sense that the branch probabilities and state values assigned to different
branches in the event tree are either fixed values or non-stochastic relationships. The
natural variability (aleatory uncertainty) in the outcomes of random events (state
variables), such as flood inflow to a reservoir, seismic ground acceleration, spillway gate
reliability, the likelihood and extent of spillway plugging with debris, population
exposure scenarios, and the timing of warning and evacuation, can be represented by a
discrete probability distribution group using a group of discrete branches emanating from
a node on the event tree.
The group of events represented by the branches must be mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive. The first condition is often met by defining events as nonoverlapping ranges of values, and the latter condition is met by ensuring that the
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collection of all ranges of values completely covers the range of possible values for the
particular state variable. For the case of between zero and five out of a total of five
spillway gates failing to open on demand, the use of discrete branches matches the
discrete count of spillway gates that malfunction. Under the full assumption of
independence the binomial probability distribution can be used to assign probabilities to
each of the six branches in the group; although the failure of spillway gates to open on
demand can involve more complicated issues of common cause failures to open of
subgroups or all gates and issues of the duration that a gate is unavailable and timing of
repair, which are better represented in a fault tree model. However, some state variables
are by their nature continuous rather than discrete. Inflow floods to a reservoir or seismic
hazard are examples. In these cases the continuous probability distribution of annual peak
inflow rates or peak ground acceleration are represented using a group of discrete
branches, where the number of branches is best determined by meeting a numerical
precision criterion similar to the approach used in numerical analysis.
In DAMRAE we have introduced a “continuous” branch to represent a continuous
range of state values. In realty the continuous branch is a group of discrete branches
where the number of branches is variable and can be determined by the user to meet
numerical precision requirements and in the case of large event trees computational time
may also be a consideration.
The first step in DAMRAE computation requires the user to manually set up the
event tree model on the DAMRAE interface with branch inputs assigned appropriately.
To support a generalized event tree calculation in DAMRAE, six types of branches are
defined as follows: i) Discrete, ii) Continuous, iii) State Function, iv) Failure, v)
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Exposure, and vi) Consequences. This branch type classification was developed
specifically for the needs of dam safety risk modeling.
A discrete branch represents a discrete random variable (e.g., the number spillway
gates that open on demand) that can take on only a finite number of state values. A
continuous branch represents a continuous random variable such as flood (e.g., peak pool
elevation) or earthquake [e.g., peak ground acceleration (PGA)] loadings, for example,
which can take on values over a continuous range of values. A state function branch
represents a deterministic relationship among variables in the event tree, such as reservoir
stage-discharge or reservoir stage-duration relationships, or vertical and horizontal
deformations of an embankment dam as a function of earthquake magnitude, PGA and
reservoir pool elevation [23]. Failure branches are included in the event tree to represent
the events of non-breach and the occurrence of one or more failure modes that lead to a
reservoir breach. Failure branches are characterized by the failure mode names assigned
to each failure branch, and the probabilities [system response probabilities (SRPs)] that
each failure mode will occur conditioned on one or more of the preceding events
(variables) that are represented by branches to the left of the failure branch. Exposure
branches represent different exposure cases (e.g., summer and winter, or day and night)
and are assigned the fractions of the time for which the respective exposure case occurs.
The estimated magnitudes of economic and life-loss consequences for combinations of
the various types of initiating events, failure modes, exposure conditions or other
preceding events are assigned to the consequence branches. A summary of these branch
types is included in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1. Types of event tree branches in DAMRAE
Branch Input
State Value

Branch Type

Description

Discrete

A discrete random variable that can
take on only a finite number of state
values

Probabilities for
each discrete
state

Title of discrete
states for each
branch

Continuous

A continuous random variable that can
take on an infinite number of state
values over the specified range

Exceedance
probabilities
associated with
state values

Range of state
values

Probability

A deterministic relationship between
state variables
The events of non-breach and the
occurrence of one or more failure
modes

1.0

User-specified
relationship

System response
probability (SRP)
value

Title of failure
mode

Exposure

Population exposure cases, e.g.,
summer and winter; or day and night.

Exposure factor
as a time fraction

Title of exposure
factor

Consequences

Life-loss or economic consequences

Not applicable

State Function
Failure

Consequence value

The input method to assign the probability or state values as branch attributes can
be selected as a fixed value, tabular interpolation or a relational equation. The tabular
interpolation or relational equation options express the probability as a function of the
state value of that branch or preceding branches or the state value as a function of the
state values of preceding branches. Also, unique branch name and branch code are
assigned by the user as branch identifiers. These are used by the DAMRAE computation
logic to designate a unique identity to each branch in the event tree. The code can be used
as a variable name in relational equations and the name is used in output tables and plots.
Event tree diagrams can become very large if they are fully developed for all
ranges of state values at all levels of the event tree. To reduce the effort required to
construct the complete event tree diagram, DAMRAE includes a collapsed node feature.
A collapsed node, which functions as the “Host Node,” takes on the sub tree structure and
the input relationship of another node, which serves as the “Donor Node.”
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Donor sub-tree
Copied sub-tree

Figure 2.7. Example of copied collapsed node

Donor sub-tree
Cloned sub-tree

Figure 2.8. Example of cloned collapsed node
There are two types of collapsed nodes in DAMRAE: i) Copied Collapsed Node,
and ii) Cloned Collapsed Node (Figures 2.7 and 2.8). When the entire succeeding sub tree
structure connected to a node (“Host Node”) is identical to the succeeding sub tree
structure of another node (“Donor Node”) located above in the event tree at the same
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branch level, the sub tree structure and all user-defined input relationships can be copied
from the Donor Node to the Host Node using one of the collapsed node options. If the
Copied Collapsed Node option is used, the copied sub tree structure and inputs can be
modified after coping with no effect on the Donor sub tree (see Figure 2.7). If the Cloned
Collapsed Node is used, the cloned sub tree structure and inputs cannot be modified after
cloning and they will remain always identical to the Donor sub tree (see Figure 2.8). In
the DAMRAE event tree diagram, the cloned Host Node references the Donor Node, but
to reduce the complexity of the diagram the cloned sub tree is not displayed except
temporarily if the user clicks on the ‘+’ symbol on the Host node.
3.2. Event tree calculation
A simplified flowchart of the event tree computational logic of DAMRAE is
depicted in Figure 2.9. The symbols used in the Figure 2.9 are as follows: a) LL = Loss of

Event Tree Structure
and Branch Inputs

Step 1

Connectivity Matrix

Step 2

Pedigree Matrix

Step 3

Step 4

Results

Probability Matrix

State Value Matrix

LL, ALL Matrices

EL, AEL Matrices

Risk Estimates
[APF, ALL, ELL,
and

Cumulative Plots
LL ,

EL ]

Figure 2.9. Simplified flowchart for the calculation logic of a single event tree
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failure modes of embankment overtopping, spillway wall overtopping, and embankment
toe erosion by re-circulating spillway flows. DAMRAE assigns a green color to all event
tree branches except for failure branches and branches that are subsequent to these
branches, which are assigned a red color. The downstream area is considered as a single
consequence center and the event tree is extended to include the life-loss and economic
consequences for this zone in Levels 5 and 6, respectively. The Levels 5 and 6
consequences branches following the spillway failure and toe erosion failure branches
(host nodes) have been cloned using the overtopping failure consequence branches as the
donor node3 since the same failure consequences are being assigned to all three failure
modes. The user-assigned branch names and the program-assigned branch indices (shown
within parentheses) are displayed adjacent to the branches in the event tree diagram
shown in Figure 2.10. Using this example event tree, the steps of the computational logic
are discussed below.
3.2.1. Connectivity matrix
The user-drawn event tree structure is first transformed into a matrix format,
known as the connectivity matrix. The connectivity matrix represents a row-cell
arrangement of the program-assigned event tree branch indices, arranged according to
their connections with other branches in the event tree. The connectivity matrix for the
example event tree with program assigned branch indices as Br1, Br2, Br3, etc. is shown
in Figure 2.11.a.
The number of columns and number of rows in the connectivity matrix are
defined by the horizontal extent (i.e., number of levels) and the vertical extent (as
3

The reference numbers displayed on the host and donor nodes (e.g., 5 in Figure 2.10)
are to aid the visual identification of the donor node corresponding to a host node.
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a) Connectivity matrix for the
example event tree shown in Figure
2.10
b) Pedigree matrix for the example
event tree shown in Figure 2.10
with ‘n’ intervals for the
continuous branch in Level 1
Figure 2.11. Example of calculation matrices in DAMRAE
described in the next subsection) of the event tree, respectively. The vertical extent of the
connectivity matrix account for the primary event tree structure shown in Figure 2.10 but
without expanding that structure to show all computational branches that are defined by
continuous branches to form the complete event tree for making event tree computations.
This full structure is captured in the pedigree matrices that are defined in the next
subsection.
3.2.2. Pedigree matrix
The connectivity matrix is expanded to generate the pedigree matrix, which
includes additional rows, inserted to incorporate the number of intervals for the
continuous branches present in the event tree. The full range of values for the continuous
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variable of flood loading, which is represented by the continuous branch in Level 1 of the
event tree, is partitioned into a number of intervals that is specified by the user. The
number of intervals should be specified to provide adequate numerical precision in the
event tree calculations and post processing [15]. If the range of peak reservoir pool
elevations in the Level 1 branch is partitioned into n (an integer number) intervals, the
connectivity matrix is expanded to include the (n+1) intervals4 for this branch and thus,
the resulting pedigree matrix shown in Figure 2.11.b is a [4(n+1)x6] matrix of branch
indices. The generated pedigree matrix is a complete representation of event tree paths,
which uniquely identifies the pathways to all terminal nodes in the event tree. In addition
to making the event tree calculation possible with all the different conditional probability
relationship that can exist in an event tree, it also facilitates the collation of the
contributions of different failure modes or loading ranges to the total risk.
3.2.3. Failure probability calculation
Only the event branches that precede the exposure and consequence branches are
used to calculate the probability of failure. As mentioned earlier, each event branch in the
event tree has branch attributes of a state value and a probability value. For the Level 1
branch, n interval values of peak reservoir pool elevation are the n state values and their
corresponding annual probabilities of occurrence are the annual probability values
representing the probability of peak reservoir pool elevations in each interval occurring.
A representative state value equal to the mid-point of the interval is assigned to each
interval. For each interval of peak reservoir pool elevation assigned in Level 1, the state
function branch in Level 2 is used to calculate the peak overtopping depth by subtracting
4

An additional interval is added to include an interval corresponding to the exceedance
of the highest value (or the last interval value).
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the dam crest elevation from the representative peak reservoir pool elevation value that is
assigned in Level 1. Since the state function branch is a single branch that does not divide
as other branches do, it is assigned a probability of 1. The Level 3 branch is also a state
function branch and therefore it is also assigned a probability of 1.0. A peak discharge
corresponding to the representative value of the peak reservoir pool elevation is obtained
by interpolation from a given reservoir stage-discharge relationship that is input by the
user. The state values for each failure branch in Level 4 is the respective branch name
(i.e., failure mode name assigned by the user) and the probability value is the conditional
probability of occurrence of each failure mode that is represented by the respective SRP
relationships input by the user. The SRP for the overtopping failure mode is conditioned
on the peak reservoir pool elevation (Level 1) and the SRP for the spillway failure mode
is conditioned on the peak reservoir overtopping depth (Level 2). The non-breach branch
in Level 4 is assigned the branch name ‘Non-Breach’ by DAMRAE as its state value and
its probability is calculated as 1- sum of the conditional probability values of the three
failure branches in each interval of peak reservoir pool elevations that are assigned in
Level 1.
The calculations for the total probability of failure for each failure mode or the
total non-breach probability are based on the state value and probability matrices. These
matrices have the same format as the pedigree matrix but with the last two columns of
consequence branches excluded. The cells of these matrices are populated with the
branch state and probability values corresponding to the respective branch indices in the
pedigree matrix. Using these matrices, the end node probability (or, pathway probability),
which is defined as the product of the probability of the initiating event and all
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conditional probabilities along the pathway [25] is calculated as follows:
p

,

.p

,

.p

,

.p

…Eq. 2.1

,

defines the pathway probability of failure for the

where

row in the matrix. In the

case when exposure factors are also multiplied in the pathway probability calculations,
the resulted end node probabilities define the pathway probabilities of life loss.
Using the end node probabilities, the annual probability of failure APF FM

for

each failure mode (FM ) in the given example is calculated as follows:
APF FM

…Eq. 2.2
RFM

where

is the index of a failure mode (i.e., =1 for ‘Overtop Fail’, =2 for ‘Spillway

Fail’, and =3 for ‘Toe Erosion’) and FM represents the corresponding failure mode of a
failure mode index . p

,

is the probability value in the ith row and jth column of the

probability matrix, R FM represents an integer set of row-numbers that correspond to the
failure mode FM , such that the state values s

,

FM ,

r R FM in the state value

matrix. In this example, Levels 2 and 3 are state function branches and therefore, p
1 and p

,

,

1, r R FM is used in the calculation.

The event tree example in Figure 2.10 is a case of non-mutually exclusive failure
events as the failure modes (i.e., overtopping, spillway failure, and toe erosion) can occur
simultaneously at some pool elevations in the upstream reservoir. For such cases, the
DAMRAE logic includes a common-cause adjustment (CCA) [9] to adjust the
conditional system response probabilities of individual failure modes. The probability
values corresponding to the failure modes are adjusted in the probability matrix before
the total failure probabilities for each failure mode are calculated such that the sum of
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their adjusted probabilities equals upper bound from the uni-model bounds theorem [26],
which is based on DeMorgan’s Rule for combining probabilities of events under the
assumption that the events are mutually independent. Specifically, a common cause
adjusted conditional probability, p′

p′

where

p

,

1
,

, ,

is computed as follows:
∏

′

1

∑

′

p

p

…Eq. 2.3

′,

′,

is the index of the failure mode FM, k is the total number of failure modes (i.e., 3

in this example case), and

′

represents the new end node probability for the rth row. The

total failure probability for failure mode
APF FM

p
RFM

,

p

is calculated as follows:
,

p

,

p′

′

,

…Eq. 2.4

RFM

The CCA approach described here is applied in combination with “SRP
Freezing.” The term “SRP Freezing” refers to the case in which the common-cause
adjustments of SRPs (conditional probabilities of failure modes) for non-mutually
exclusive flood-related failure modes [9] are held constant for all loading intervals above
the first loading interval for which at least one SRP becomes 1.0, indicating that failure
would certainly occur by that loading interval. This is illustrated in Figure 2.12.a where
the values of SRPs of two failure modes, ‘Failure1’ and ‘Failure2’, increase until the
water level reaches to a level at which the failure occurs by ‘Failure1’ (i.e., the SRP of
‘Failure1’ becomes equal to 1.0 implying that failure is certain to occur). Beyond this
failure point SRPs of both the failure modes are fixed at their respective values at the
water level where failure is considered to be certain to occur. SRP freezing is
implemented to avoid unrealistic estimates of the probability of failure for individual

38

1.0
Failure 1

Failure 2
Overtopping
Depth
Unadjusted SRP

Adjusted SRP

a) SRP freezing

b) Consequence Freezing
Figure 2.12. Illustrations of SRP freezing and consequences freezing
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failure modes, such as attributing probability to a failure mode with a SRP threshold at a
higher loading interval than the interval for which the SRP for another failure mode first
becomes 1.0.
3.2.4. Incremental consequences calculation
The non-breach and failure consequences, incorporated in Level 5 and 6 of the
event tree, are assigned as a function of peak discharge values (Level 3). DAMRAE
places the interpolated values of consequences for each interval of the Level 1 branch in
the consequence matrices for life-loss (LL) and economic consequences (EC), which
have the same number of rows [i.e., 4(n+1) in our example] as the pedigree matrix. A
separate column is contained in each consequences matrix for each different consequence
center, which are either different physical locations for which life-loss and economic
consequences are input or they could represent different components of consequences,
such as property damage and business interruption losses, for example. The components
must be additive to obtain the total consequences. In the simplified example there is only
one consequences center.
Similar to the “SRP Freezing” option, the DAMRAE computation also includes
an option for “Failure Consequences Freezing.” The freezing of failure consequences
holds the assigned values of failure consequences constant for all loading intervals above
the first loading interval for which at least one SRP becomes 1.0, indicating that failure
would certainly occur by that loading interval. This is illustrated in Figure 2.12.b where
both the non-breach and failure consequences keep increasing until the water level
reaches the level at which failure is considered to be certain to occur (i.e., where SRP
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becomes 1.0 for at least one failure mode). For water levels above that certain failure
point, failure consequences are kept constant at their values at the water level where
failure is considered to be certain to occur, whereas non-breach consequences keep
increasing with increases in the water level. The incremental consequences, which are
calculated as the difference between the failure and non-breach consequences, are
assigned a zero value for the higher water levels where non-breach consequences are
greater than the failure consequences to avoid the negative incremental consequence
values. This type of freezing is implemented to avoid unrealistic estimates of the failure
consequences for individual failure modes, such as for the case in which failure certainly
occurs (i.e., SRP = 1.0) on the rising limb of the flood hydrograph for which failure
consequences would be less than if the failure did not occur until the hydrograph peak,
for example. In this case, failure consequences would be frozen at the loading interval for
which the first SRP becomes 1.0 because this represents the most severe level of failure
consequences given that failure must occur by the that loading level and cannot occur at
higher loading levels. To assign higher failure consequences at more severe loading
intervals would give an overestimate of the total and incremental consequence
attributable to dam failure. The freezing of failure consequences is applied to the life-loss
and economic consequence matrices prior to calculating the total failure consequences for
each failure mode.
The failure consequences are calculated as incremental consequences, which are
defined as the difference between failure and non-breach consequences for flood-induced
failure modes, although total consequences can be obtained by defining non-breach
consequences as zero. The incremental life-loss (LL) and economic consequences (EC)
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associated with each failure mode (FM ) is calculated as follows:
LL FM

,
RFM

and

,

∆

′,

,
RFM

,

…Eq. 2.5

,

RFM

EC FM

where

∆

′,

,

…Eq. 2.6

RFM

are the life-loss and economic consequence values at the ith row of

the event tree and the jth column (corresponding to a particular consequences center) of
the life-loss and economic consequence matrices, respectively, r ′

r

, is the row

index of non-breach consequence corresponding to row r, and ∆ and ∆ represent the
incremental consequences.
Annualized (incremental) consequences are calculated for each row in the
consequences matrices, corresponding to each terminal branch or unique event tree
pathway. Total annualized (incremental) consequences (ALL and AEC) associated with
each failure mode (FM ) are calculated as follows:
′

ALL FM

,

′

′,

RFM

RFM

where

′

…Eq. 2.7

,

RFM

′

AEC FM

∆

,

′

′,

RFM

∆

,

…Eq. 2.8

is the end node probability for the rth row after the common-cause adjustment

(CCA).
The ranges of incremental consequences, i.e., the minimum and maximum
incremental values of life-loss and economic consequences, for each failure mode (FM)
are calculated as follows:
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where

LL

and

LL

min ∆

,

, max ∆

EC

min ∆

,

, max ∆

EC ,

…Eq. 2.9

,

,

…Eq. 2.10

respectively, represents the range of incremental consequences for

life-loss and economic consequences.
The event tree calculation step is performed one or more times depending on the
selection of the calculation options: Base Run and Without CCA Sensitivity. The Base
Run applies a common-cause adjustment [9] to non-mutually exclusive failure modes if
this option is selected by the user. The Without Common-cause Adjustment Sensitivity
calculation option generates the probability matrix without any adjustments in failure
mode SRPs. This option is useful to assess the role of the common-cause adjustment as if
a failure mode group is mutually exclusive failure modes instead of non-mutually
exclusive failure modes.
3.3. Event tree results
The direct results of event tree calculation can be categorized as follows: i) Risk
Estimates, which are the annual probability for failure and non-breach (APF), annualized
incremental life-loss (ALL), and annualized economic consequences (AEC) and the
ranges of incremental consequences (

LL

and

EC )

for each failure mode and as totals;

and ii) Cumulative Plots, which are the plots of the cumulative values of selected risk
estimates against the state values or probabilities of any user-selected branch level in the
event tree. In particular, when these plots are made against the state values of a loading
branch that are assigned to each calculation interval over the entire range of loading, they
provide a useful visual tool to understand the contributions from individual failure modes
to the overall risk over the complete range of loading. An example of a cumulative annual
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probability of failure (for the three flood failure modes and their total) versus peak pool
reservoir elevation plot is shown in Figure 2.13.

4. DAMRAE outputs
The risk estimates and cumulative plots for each event tree are classified as LevelI (Event Tree Level) outputs. The post-processing step of DAMRAE allows the user to
do the following with the Level-I outputs: i) combine the risk estimates for different
event trees (e.g. representing different loading types e.g., flood and earthquake) under
each run case or safety state included in a DAMRAE project; ii) compare different run
cases in terms of their risk reduction and cost effectiveness of risk reduction; and iii)
compare each run case against USACE tolerable risk guidelines [14]. The results
generated in the post-processing step are classified as Level-II (Project Level) outputs.
These outputs are categorized into the seven types that are described in the Sections 4.14.7. They are represented schematically in Figure 2.14 where Level-I outputs for different

Annual Probability of Failure, APF (/year)

Cumulative Plot
2.E-04
2.E-04
1.E-04
8.E-05
4.E-05
0.E+00
130

130.5

Overtopping Failure

131
131.5
132
Peak Pool Reservation Elevation (m.)
Spillway Failure

Toe Erosion

132.5

Total

Figure 2.13. Example of a cumulative risk estimate (annual failure probability) vs.
loading range
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Figure 2.14. Level-I and -II DAMRAE outputs
event trees (e.g., flood, earthquake, etc.) are shown in a group in the left-hand side of the
figure and Level-II outputs for the different event trees are shown in the right-hand side
of the figure.
4.1. Annual probability of failure
This tabular output type includes the probability of failure (/year) for each failure
mode and their percentage contribution to the totals across all failure modes. Also,
percentage reduction in the failure probability for each failure mode as compared to the
baseline state is displayed for risk reduction states. The probability of failure for each
failure mode and their total are compared against the tolerable risk limit value of 1 in
10,000 (1x10-4) /year. Although this guideline applies only to the total probability of
failure, values for each failure mode and the total that are greater than the tolerable risk
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limit are highlighted in red and those values that are one order below the limit value are
highlighted in yellow. All other values are highlighted in green.
4.2. Annualized incremental life-loss
Annualized incremental life loss (lives/year), percent contribution towards the total,
range of incremental life loss (i.e., minimum and maximum incremental values of life
loss), and a weighted mean (N) value of incremental life loss (calculated as N =
ALL/APF) are tabulated for each failure mode and for the total. Also, the reduction in
annualized incremental life-loss consequences as compared with the baseline case are
tabulated for each failure mode and the total for the risk reduction states. Annualized
incremental life loss values for the failure modes and their total are compared against the
tolerable risk limit value of 0.001 (1x10-3) lives/year. The same color highlighting
convention is used as described for Annual Probability of Failure in Section 4.1.
4.3. Annualized incremental economic consequences
Annualized incremental economic consequences ($/year), percent contribution
towards the total, the range of incremental economic consequences represented by
minimum and maximum incremental values of economic consequences, and weighted
mean ($) value of incremental economic consequences (calculated as $ = AEC/APF), are
tabulated for each failure mode and for the total. Also, the reductions in annualized
incremental economic consequences as compared with the baseline case are tabulated for
each failure mode and the total for the risk reduction states. There are no tolerable risk
guidelines that apply to annualized incremental economic consequences and hence no
color highlighting.
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4.4. Incremental risk-reduction
This tabular output type includes the following:
a) (Adjusted) Equivalent Annual Implementation Cost for Risk-Reduction
Measure ($/year), ACCRRM

ACCRRM

OMRRM

OMB (“Adjusted” refers

to including the increase in O&M cost)
b) Annual Benefit of Risk-Reduction Measure ($/year), BRRM
c) Total Economic Cost ($/year), CRRM
d) Benefit: Cost Ratio, BCRRM

ECRRM

ECB

ECRRM

ACCRRM

BRRM
CRRM

where ACCRRM = Equivalent annual implementation cost for risk-reduction measure
($/year), OMRRM = Annual O&M cost for risk-reduction measure ($/year), OMB = Annual
O&M cost for baseline ($/year), ECB = Annualized incremental economic consequences
for baseline ($/year), and ECRRM = Annualized incremental economic consequences for
risk-reduction measure ($/year).
In addition, the following measures of the cost effectiveness of life-loss risk,
which are inputs to an ALARP evaluation:
a) Cost to Save a Statistical Life ($/Life), CSSLRRM
b) Disproportionality Ratio, R RRM

ACC′RRM BRRM
ALLB ALLRRM

CSSLRRM
WTP

where ALLB = Annualized incremental life loss for baseline (lives/year), ALLB =
Annualized incremental live loss after implementation of the risk-reduction measure
(lives/year), and WTP= Willingness to pay to prevent a statistical fatality ($). WTP is
commonly referred as the “value-of-saving a-statistical-life” (VSL) by OMB, USDOT
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and other federal agencies. USACE uses the USDOT value of VSL which is currently
$6.2 million. (http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/reports.htm).
4.5. Tolerable risk guidelines
Tabulations of the outcomes of evaluations against the following four USACE
[14] tolerable risk guidelines are incorporated into DAMRAE:
a. Total Annual Probability of Failure (APF): APF > 1 in 10,000 (1x10-4)/year is
considered as unacceptable, and is displayed as ‘No’ with red background.
APF ≤ 1x10-4 is displayed as ‘Yes-ALARP?’ with a green background.
b. Individual Risk: The individual tolerable risk limit is set at 1 in 10,000 (1x104

)/year. For the total APF ≤ 1x10-4, individual risk is displayed as ‘Yes-

ALARP?’ with a green background, while APF > 1 in 10,000 (1x10-4)/year is
displayed as ‘Evaluated Externally’ with a yellow background.
c. Probability Distribution of Potential Incremental Life Loss (F-N Chart):
Societal risk is evaluated based on the probability distribution of annualized
life loss due to dam failure (F-N chart). If the probability distribution curve
lies below (≤) the guideline curve, the societal risk evaluation outcome is
displayed as ‘Yes-ALARP’ with a green background, and otherwise, as ‘No’
with a red background.
d. Total Annualized Incremental Life Loss (ALL): The tolerable risk limit for
the total annualized life loss is set as 0.001 lives/year. ALL > 0.001 lives/year
is displayed as ‘No’ with a red background, and otherwise, as ‘Yes-ALARP?’
with a green background.
In addition a partial evaluation of the ALARP justification is also displayed under
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the same tab for the Benefit: Cost Ratio and Disproportionality Ratio. Other ALARP
evaluation considerations require a qualitative evaluation and therefore must be
performed externally to DAMRAE.
4.6. Non-breach risk:
Annualized non-breach risk estimates for probability, annualized life loss and
annualized economic consequences for the range of non-breach inundation events
considered in the risk analysis calculations are tabulated under this type. Also, the range
of consequences represented by the minimum and maximum values of non-breach life
loss (lives) and non-breach economic consequences ($) are included under this tabulation.
For risk reduction alternatives and stages, estimates of reductions (or increase) in nonbreach benefits (both lives/year and $/year) are also included. There are no tolerable risk
guidelines that apply to non-breach risk.
4.7. Residual risk
This tab includes the total failure incremental risk, total non-breach risk and total
residual risk as the sum of incremental risk and non-breach risk for the life-loss and
economic consequences.
4.8. Graphical outputs
As part of the risk evaluation against the USACE tolerable risk guidelines [14], FN and

-N charts (illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.3, respectively) are generated to

evaluate the societal incremental life safety inundation risk. The F-N chart is a plot of F,
the annual probability of exceedance (greater than or equal to) of potential life loss versus
N, the incremental potential life loss. The

-N chart displays f, the annual failure
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probability against the N, the average annual life loss. Also, an F-$ plot can be generated
to assess the incremental economic inundation risk. The F-$ plot displays the annual
probability of exceedance of economic consequences versus the incremental economic
consequences.
Similar to the inundation risk F-N and F-$ plots, non-breach F-N and F-$ plots are
generated to evaluate the non-breach inundation risk. For these plots, annual probability
of non-breach event and the associated consequences (life loss and economic
consequences) are used. There are no tolerable risk guidelines that apply to non-breach
risk but the societal risk guidelines that apply to incremental failure risk are shown on the
F-N plot (see Figure 2.3) for reference purposes only.

5. Summary of DAMRAE features
DAMRAE is developed to overcome the significant limitations of commercially
available risk analysis tools, which are ill-suited for dam safety risk analysis applications
as documented in Section 1. In some of the studies [10, 22], these limitations have been
addressed through the use of spreadsheets, often including VBA macros to facilitate
looping over the range of initiating (loading) events with variable step sizes, inputs of
SRPs and consequence relationships, and post-processing for reporting and risk
evaluation. However, the spreadsheet approach lacks generality and can require
significant effort to apply to a specific dam or to modify the event tree structure to
represent risk-reduction measures or for other purposes. DAMRAE event tree models can
be readily applied to represent risk-reduction measures and provide the necessary input,
output, and reporting features to eliminate the need of any external computational scripts.
In addition interface options, such as add, delete, and relocate branches, accompanied
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with advanced collapsed node copy and clone functionality provide easy and flexible
event tree construction and modification features. The inputs for branches can be in the
form of a numeric value, relational equation, or a tabular interpolation. The generated
outputs include annualized risk estimates for each failure mode that is defined in the userdrawn event tree structure.
The overall structure of DAMRAE is designed to accommodate the iterative
nature of dam safety risk analysis. An event tree model, once set up, can be copied to
other run cases (i.e., safety states) or can be imported into any another DAMRAE project
as desired. Thus, an analysis begun with the existing states of dam structure and
consequence scenarios can easily be extended to analyze structural and non-structural
RRMs by modifying the event tree structure and revising inputs for loading and SRPs,
failure consequences, risk reduction cost inputs, and other inputs such as state functions
representing the reservoir stage-discharge relationship. Within a DAMRAE project, the
post-processing step enables a flexible tabulation of results combining functionality to
obtain the contributions to the total dam failure risk from various combinations of failure
modes, consequence centers, and exposure cases for a dam safety state. The DAMRAE
interface includes a “drill-down” functionality for displaying the breakdown of tabular
results by failure mode, exposure case or consequence centers. The probabilityconsequence pairs for each user-created combination are collected by the program to
automatically generate the USACE tolerable risk guideline curves. The post-processing
also facilitates the comparison of risk estimates with other safety states for the same dam
following risk reduction, or when new information is obtained from investigations and
analyses.
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6. Concluding remarks
DAMRAE is a flexible software tool for conducting dam safety risk analysis
using the event tree form of risk model. It is proposed as a solution to overcome the
limitations of commercial riskwares or the use of spreadsheet models, which are
commonly used in this field. DAMRAE offers an advanced comprehensive ETA tool
without compromising the basic flexibility and user-friendliness embedded in most of the
commercial riskwares for constructing and quantifying event trees. DAMRAE provides a
canvas for the analyst to efficiently capture the art and science of dam safety risk analysis
in a dam-specific event tree model, and a tool to produce precise risk estimates for the
constructed model and assigned inputs. DAMRAE does not include any recommended
event tree forms although work is on-going to provide guidance on forms for a range of
dam safety applications. DAMRAE does not provide recommended input assignments
since these must be estimated for each dam, and guidance is available for specific types
of failure modes (e.g., USACE [27] and USBR [28]).
DAMRAE development is motivated by the surging acceptance of formal risk
analysis in dam safety and the emerging requirements of portfolio risk assessment
framework from the owners of large number of dams. The computational aspects of
DAMRAE follow the theoretical advancements in the field. The object-oriented structure
of DAMRAE components allows it to be compatible with a database environment. The
original concept of DAMRAE has been extended to develop a database configured
version of DAMRAE (referred to as DAMRAE-db) to serve as a computational core
engine in a portfolio risk assessment and management system, for long dam applications
[24] and to make calculations more rapidly.
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DAMRAE has been used by the USACE, Tennessee Valley Authority, RAC
Engineers & Economists and Utah State University to perform numerous risk analyses on
major dams in the US and overseas. The event tree example included in this paper is only
intended to provide the basic concepts of DAMRAE computations as the real scope of
DAMRAE capabilities extends beyond the limits of this paper. A detailed example of a
DAMRAE application for a dam safety risk assessment is presented in Chapter 3 of this
dissertation. In addition, the prototype uncertainty analysis version, DAMRAE-U, is
described in Chapter 4 and a detailed example is presented in Chapter 5 of this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
DAMRAE APPLICATION FOR AN EXAMPLE DAM SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT

ABSTRACT
The DAMRAE framework provides a convenient platform to structure the risk
assessment of a dam in its existing condition, for risk reduction alternatives and at
various stages of implementing a risk reduction plan. The computational logic within the
framework quantifies the event tree form of the risk models, performs comparison against
US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) dam safety tolerable risk guidelines, and displays
risk estimates in tabular and graphical forms for the dam in its exiting state and for other
states representing risk reduction alternatives and stages that are included in a DAMRAE
project. An example risk assessment is presented in this paper to demonstrate the
application of DAMRAE functionalities. The example project includes a main dam and a
saddle dam and event trees for flood and earthquake loading for the existing condition
and five risk reduction alternatives implemented in a staged fashion. The paper details the
structure and inputs of the flood and earthquake event tree models, describes the
modifications for the risk reduction alternatives, and discusses the DAMRAE outputs and
their evaluation against tolerable risk guidelines.

1. Introduction
Dam safety risk assessment can be used in an iterative manner to evaluate
whether estimated risks have been reduced sufficiently. The risk analysis typically starts
with the existing dam baseline case and then the estimated reduced risk is estimated for
structural alternative risk reduction measures (e.g., upstream reservoir elevation, spillway
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capacity, number of functional gates etc.), and non-structural alternative risk reduction
measures (RRMs) (e.g., increased warning time, enhanced evacuation planning etc.)
combined into risk reduction plans that are formulated to address significant failure
modes and factors that lead to high life loss. The staged implementation of RRM
components of the overall risk reduction plan can be examined to identify and justify an
implementation sequence. For the risk assessment of each stage (including the existing
condition), all credible and significant failure modes are considered and the total
estimated risk is evaluated against a tolerable risk guidelines (TRG) (e.g., ANCOLD [1]
and USACE [2]). The flood and earthquake event tree models developed and quantified
to include all credible and significant failure modes for the existing condition are
modified and re-quantified for each risk reduction alternatives or stage to represent the
changes associated with the structural or non-structural risk reduction measure. The dam
failure risk for all failure modes that are included in the risk model is combined to
estimate the total risk.
The architecture of the DAMRAE framework developed by the authors, including
the underlying computational algorithm for the event tree analysis, the form of
DAMRAE risk estimates, and unique contributions of the framework, is described in
Chapter 1. In DAMRAE, event trees can be constructed by the user via a user interface
using the types of event tree branches summarized in Table 3.1. Each event tree included
in a DAMRAE project can be quantified to obtain the probability of failure and
annualized breach and non-breach risk estimates and ranges of associated life-loss and
economic consequences. The results for all the event trees included under a dam safety
state can be combined to obtain the contributions to the total dam failure risk from each
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Table 3.1. Types of event tree branches in DAMRAE [3]

Branch Type

Description

Branch Input
Probability

State Value

Discrete

A discrete random variable that can
take on only a finite number of state
values

Probabilities for each
discrete state

Title of
discrete states
for each
branch

Continuous

A continuous random variable that can
take on an infinite number of state
values over the specified range

Exceedance
probabilities associated
with state values

Range of state
values

State Function

A deterministic relationship between
state variables

1.0

User-specified
relationship

Failure

The events of non-breach and the
occurrence of one or more failure
modes

System response
probability (SRP) value

Title of failure
mode

Exposure

Population exposure cases, e.g.,
summer and winter; or day and night.

Exposure factor as a
time fraction

Title of
exposure
factor

Consequences

Life-loss or economic consequences

Not applicable

Consequence
value

failure mode, consequence center, or exposure case. The probability-consequence pairs
for each dam safety state are processed by DAMRAE to generate the USACE tolerable
risk guideline charts. The post-processing step of DAMRAE also facilitates the
evaluation of risk estimates against the USACE tolerable risk guidelines [2] and the
comparison of risk estimates with other safety states for the same dam to examine the
estimated effects of risk reduction measures, or the sensitivity of risk estimates to new
information obtained from investigations and analyses or other changes in model inputs.
The significance of the estimated risks for each stage is evaluated using the
following USACE tolerable risk “limit values” [2]:
1) An Annual Probability of Failure (APF) limit value of 1 in 10,000 /year as a
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measure of the performance of the dam (see the horizontal limit line at 1 in
10,000./year on Figure 3.1)
2) An Individual Risk (IR) limit value of 1 in 10,000 /year as a measure of life
safety risk expressed as the probability of life loss for the identifiable
person(s) most at risk.
3) A Societal Risk (SR) expressed as a limit of tolerability on a cumulative
probability distribution (F-N Chart) of exceeding various magnitudes of lifeloss as a measure of life-safety risk to a non-identifiable or random persons
(see the slopping and vertical limit lines on Figure 3.2).
4) An Annualized Life Loss (ALL) of 0.001 lives/year as the average magnitude
of life loss from the probability distribution of life loss in 3) as an average

Annual Probability of Failure
Incremental Annualized Life Loss

1.E-03

1.E-01

Societal Tolerable Risk Limit
Increasing justification to
take action to reduce risk
or better define the risk.

F, Probability per Year of Potential Life Loss ≥ N

Estimated Annual Failure Probability, f

1.E-02

1.E-03

1.E-04

1.E-05
Diminishing justification to
take action to reduce risk or
better define the risk.

1.E-06

1.E-04

Risks are unacceptable,
except in exceptional
circumstances.

1.E-05

1.E-06

1.E-07

Risks are tolerable
only if they satisfy
the ALARP
requirements.

Low Probability - High
Consequence Events

Low Probability – High
Consequence Events

1.E-07

1.E-08

1.E-08
1

10

100

Esitmated Average Life Loss,

1,000

10,000

1
10
100
1000
N, number of potential fatalities due to dam failure

10000

(b)

Figure 3.1. USACE APF and ALL tolerable Figure 3.2. USACE societal
guidelines (F-N Chart) [2]
risk guidelines (f-N Chart) [2]

risk
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measure of societal life safety risk (see the sloping limit line at 0.001
lives/year on Figure 3.1).
In the second part of the risk evaluation process, ALARP (as low as reasonably
practical) criteria is evaluated. ALARP evaluation is both qualitative and quantitative in
nature and it should take the following into account: the level of risk in relation to the
tolerable risk limits; the disproportion between the sacrifice (money, time, trouble, and
effort) in implementing the risk reduction measures and the subsequent risk reduction
achieved; the cost effectiveness of the risk reduction measure; compliance with essential
USACE guidelines; and societal concerns as revealed by consultation with the
community and other stakeholders.
The consideration of the cost effectiveness or “disproportionality” associated with
the cost of achieving life safety risk reduction relative to the life safety benefit achieved
is a quantitative aspect of an ALARP evaluation. Two factors – Disproportionality Ratio
(R) and Cost-to-Save-a-Statistical-Life (CSSL) are estimated as quantitative measures to
justify the implementation of a risk reduction measure to reduce the risk below the
tolerable risk limit. CSSL is a measure of cost effectiveness estimated as a return (in term
of the life-safety benefit) for the cost invested to achieve the life-safety risk reduction.
Disproportionality Ratio is a measure of disproportion between the sacrifice (money,
time, trouble and effort) in implementing the risk reduction measure and the subsequent
risk reduction achieved [1-3].
A hypothetical example of a dam safety risk assessment is used in this paper to
demonstrate the computational features of DAMRAE. Section 2 of this paper describes
the example dam, the dam safety issues, and the event tree models and their inputs used
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in this example risk assessment. In Section 3 modifications made to event tree models are
described to represent the risk reduction alternatives and stages. Risk assessment results
are discussed in Section 4, and a summary and conclusions are included in Section 5.

2. Existing dam example risk assessment
The hypothetical example dam consists of a main embankment dam and a saddle
embankment dam, both with the same crest elevation of 673 ft. msl. The main dam is
evaluated for the flood and earthquake performance failure risk, whereas only the flood
risk is considered for the saddle dam. The following seven types of flood and floodinternal failure modes are considered in the flood event tree:
a. Slope instability of the main dam (SI-M),
b) Overtopping of the main dam (OT-M),
c) Piping through the main dam embankment (PE-M),
d) Piping through the main dam foundation (PF-M),
e) Piping along the outlet works associated with the main dam embankment (POM),
f) Overtopping of the saddle dam (OT-S), and
g) Piping through the saddle dam embankment (PE-S).
The following two liquefaction-induced failure modes are considered in the
earthquake event tree for the main dam:
a) Overtopping failure resulting from the vertical crest deformation (VD), and
b) Seepage erosion through cracks (SEC) failure resulting from disrupted filters
and drains and transverse cracking developed by liquefaction-induced
deformation (SEC).
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The risk assessment is first performed for the initial stage (i.e., the existing
condition baseline case) and for the various risk reduction measures (RRMs) as
alternatives and as stages. A schematic of the DAMRAE runs for this hypothetical dam is
shown in Figure 3.3. After the initial stage risk assessment, a stability berm and filter is
implemented to saddle dam as Risk Reduction Stage 1 (RRS 1) to reduce the risk of
piping failure under the flood loading and therefore with the flood event tree modified to
represent this RRM. Following RRS 1, two alternatives are considered to further reduce
the risk as ‘Risk Reduction Alternative 2.1’ (RRA 2.1) and ‘Risk Reduction Alternative
2.2’ (RRA 2.1). For the RRA 2.1, the repair of the main dam outlet works is considered
to reduce the risk of the main dam embankment failure by piping along the outlet works
whereas, a six-foot raise of the saddle dam to reduce the likelihood of overtopping failure

Initial Stage
(Existing dam Condition)

Risk Reduction Stage 1 (RRS1)
(Saddle Dam Berm & Filter)

Risk Reduction Alt. 2.1 (RRA 2.1)
(Main Dam Outlet Works)

Risk Reduction Alt. 2.2 (RRA 2.2)
(Raise Saddle Dam)

Risk Reduction Stage 2 (RRS2)
(Main Dam Outlet Works)

Risk Reduction Alt. 3.1 (RRA 3.1)
(Spillway Widening)

Risk Reduction Alt. 3.2 (RRA 3.2)
(Raise Main & Saddle Dams)

Risk Reduction Alt 3.3 (RRA 3.3)
(Raise Saddle Dam)

Figure 3.3. Schematic of the DAMRAE runs for the existing condition and risk reduction
alternatives and stages for the hypothetical dam
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is considered under the RRA 2.2. Among these two competing alternatives, RRA 2.1 is
selected for the implementation and it becomes the next stage of the risk assessment, (i.e.,
RRS 2) to be evaluated. To assess the possibility of further risk reduction following the
‘Risk Reduction Stage 2’, the three ‘Risk Reduction Alternatives 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3’ are
considered, where these three alternatives are, respectively, spillway widening, raising
the main and saddle dams, and raising the saddle dam only. Therefore RRA 3.2 includes
the saddle dam raise that was evaluated under RRA 2.2.
2.1. Flood event tree
The Flood event tree for the flood and flood-internal induced failure modes is
shown in Figure 3.4. Level 1 of the event tree is a continuous branch representing 500
intervals of annual exceedance probability (AEP) ranging from (1 in 1.01) to (1 in 1x108)
for which event tree calculations are made in DAMRAE to analyses the entire range of
flood loading. For each interval of AEP, the corresponding peak reservoir pool elevation
(PRE) is interpolated from the peak reservoir elevation (PRE) flood frequency
relationship (PRE vs. AEP) relationship shown in Figure 3.5 as the mid-point of each
interval.
The Level 2 state function branch is included to calculate the peak discharge
value corresponding to the mid-point peak reservoir pool elevation calculated for each
interval are assigned in Level 1. The peak discharge values are interpolated from the
user-input PRE vs. peak discharge relationship shown in Figure 3.6. This branch is
required for the calculation of non-breach consequence (life-loss and economic
consequences), which are defined as a function of peak discharge and used for the
calculation of incremental failure consequences.
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Level 5 is a failure branch group representing flood and flood-internal failure
modes. The probabilities of the overtopping failure of the main and saddle dams are
conditioned on their respective reservoir pool overtopping depths as calculated in Level 3
and 4, respectively, as shown in Figure 3.7 b and f. The SRP relationships shown in
Figure 3.7 for the slope instability failure mode and the other piping failure modes are
calculated as functions of the peak reservoir pool elevation that is assigned in Level 1. All
seven failure modes included in Level 5 are considered to be non-mutually exclusive, and
therefore, a common-cause adjustment option with SRP and consequence freezing [3]
with respect to pool elevation is selected.
Level 6 includes the day and night exposure branches to represent the variations
in the size and exposure conditions of the population at risk (PAR) over a 24-hour period.
The day and night exposures are assigned exposure factors of 10/24 and 14/24,
respectively, which are treated the same as branch probabilities in the event tree
calculations.
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Slope Instability SRP
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Figure 3.7. SRP relationships for the main and saddle dams (Flood event tree Level 5
inputs)
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Levels 7 and 8 of the event tree include the life-loss and economic consequence
branches, respectively. Non-breach life-loss estimates are assigned as a function of peak
discharge (Level 2), whereas different failure modes associated with the main and saddle
dams are assigned as a function of peak reservoir pool elevation (Level 1). These various
life-loss and economic consequence relationships are shown in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9,
respectively.
2.2. Earthquake event tree
The earthquake event tree is shown in Figure 3.10. It begins with an earthquake
loading or seismic hazard relationship represented by a continuous branch in Level 1.
continuous
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Figure 3.8. Flood life-loss consequences (Flood event tree Level 7 inputs)
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Figure 3.9. Flood economic consequences (Flood event tree Level 8 inputs)
accelerations (PGAs) ranging from 0.1g to 0.65g. The probability of each interval of
PGA occurring is calculated as the difference of the annual exceedance probabilities
(AEP) at each end of the interval, which are calculated from the PGA vs. AEP

Figure 3.10. Earthquake event tree for the hypothetical dam
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relationship shown in Figure 3.11. A mid-point representative value of PGA is also
calculated.
The Level 2 continuous branch represents 24 intervals of the range of reservoir
stage between elevations 557 ft. msl. to 647 ft. msl. For each interval of reservoir stage
(or pool elevation), the fraction of time that the interval of pool elevations occurs is
obtained by taking the difference between the interpolated durations from the poolduration relationship shown in Figure 3.12. A mid-point representative value of reservoir
pool elevation is also calculated.
A state function branch is included in Level 3 of the event tree to obtain a best
estimate the vertical crest settlement of the dam. For each assigned combination of a midpoint PGA value (Level 1) and a mid-point pool elevation value (Level 2), the best
estimate of vertical crest deformation is interpolated from a two-way relationship of
vertical deformation with PGA and pool elevation as shown in Figure 3.13. This
relationship is based on estimates of vertical deformation obtained from applying the
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FLAC [4] model to the study dam for many combinations of PGA and pool elevation. In
practice additional combinations would be considered for different ranges of earthquake
magnitude (see Bowles et al. [5]) since this is an important consideration is estimating the
response of an embankment dam and foundation to liquefaction. However, as a
simplification, earthquake magnitude has not been included in this hypothetical example.
The estimated value of vertical deformation is used to obtain the conditional
probability of overtopping failure in the failure branch in Level 4. Following the method
described by Bowles et al. [5], the liquefaction-induced overtopping SRP is calculated
based on constructing a judgmentally assigned triangular distribution about the best
estimate of vertical deformation obtained in Level 3 to represent estimation uncertainty,
and calculating the probability that the deformed crest elevation would fall lower than the
pool elevation as schematically described in Figure 3.14. The inclusion of this
consideration of uncertainty is important because of the extremely asymmetric nature of
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the consequences or loss function. This method is assigned in DAMRAE using relational
equations in a conditional statement (If-else) form of Equation 3.1.
0,
1,
OTSRP
1

.

2
0.5

,

2

,

0.5

…Eq 3.1

where, a, b, and c, respectively, represent the dam crest elevation, vertical deformation
and pool elevation as shown in Figure 3.14.
If the pool elevation is not high enough to overtop the deformed crest of the dam
to cause the overtopping failure in Level 4, the possibility of dam failure by seepage
erosion through cracks (SEC) is represented in the failure branch in Level 5 of the event
tree. The system response probability for a SEC failure is estimated using a two-way
relationship with vertical deformation (Level 3) and pool elevation (Level 2) as shown in
Figure 3.15. Unlike the overtopping failure which can be considered to initiate at the time
of the earthquake, the initiation of the SEC failure mode takes place sometime after the
earthquake occurrence [6]. This time delay in SEC failure initiation results in an increase
the warning time, which results in smaller estimates of life loss. The variability in this
time delay is represented by a continuous branch included in Level 6 of the event tree.
The continuous branch includes twenty intervals of time to SEC failure ranging from 30
minutes to 315 minutes. The associated probability of each time interval is estimated
based on an exceedance probability relationship of the time to SEC failure as a function
of pool elevation shown in Figure 3.16.
Level 7 exposure branches represent the day and night exposure cases,
respectively, with exposure factors of 10/24 and 14/24, respectively. Levels 8 and 9
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represent the life-loss and economic consequences, respectively. The life-loss
consequences for the earthquake-induced overtopping failure are assigned as a function
of pool elevation as illustrated in Figure 3.17, whereas the SEC failure life-loss in Figure
3.18 is conditioned on both the pool elevation and the time delay in SEC failure initiation
as defined in Level 6. The economic consequences are assigned as a function of pool
elevation as shown in Figure 3.19.

3. Risk reduction measures
The flood and earthquake event trees constructed for the existing dam baseline
risk assessment were modified for the various risk reduction measures shown in Figure
3.3 as follows:
a) Risk Reduction Stage (RRS) 1 – A new run-case was added following the
‘Initial Stage” in the DAMRAE project hierarchy to contain the modified
event trees for the case of implementing the stability berm and filter for the
saddle dam. An equivalent annual implementation cost for this RRM was
input as $697,048/year. The flood and earthquake event trees were copied
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from the initial stage and the saddle dam piping through embankment SRP
relationship in Level 5 of the flood event tree was modified to represent the
implementation of this RRM.
b) Risk Reduction Alternatives (RRAs) 2.1 and 2.2 – Two alternative runcases were added following RRS 1 in the DAMRAE project hierarchy to
evaluate two options for the next risk reduction stage. Equivalent annual
implementation costs were input as $348,524/year for both the alternatives.
The flood and earthquake event trees were copied from RRS 1 for both of
these alternative run-cases. For RRA 2.1, the SRP relationship for the main
dam embankment piping along the outlet works in Level 5 of the flood event
tree was modified to represent the repair of the main dam outlet works. For
RRA 2.2, the flood event tree Level 4 relational equation was changed to
represent the six-foot raise of the saddle dam.
c) Risk Reduction Stage (RRS) 2 – Since RRA 2.1 was selected to be
implemented as RRS 2 this new run-case was added following RRS 1 in the
DAMRAE project hierarchy by copying the flood and earthquake event trees
from RRA 2.1 without any modification and the same equivalent annual
implementation cost of $348,524/year was input.
d) Risk Reduction Alternatives (RRA) 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 – Three alternative runcases were added following RRS 2 to evaluate these options for the next stage
of risk reduction. Equivalent annual implementation costs of $2,788,191/year,
$3,485,239/year and $348,524/year, respectively, were input. The flood and
earthquake event trees for each of these alternative run-cases were copied
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from the RRS 2 and the modifications that are listed in Table 3.2 were made.

4. Results
DAMRAE was used to quantify the event trees for the existing dam baseline
condition, risk reduction alternatives and risk reduction stages described in Sections 2
and 3. Some of the results obtained using DAMRAE are discussed in the following
subsections.
4.1. Annual probability of failure (APF)
A comparison of the estimated annual probabilities of failure for the initial stage,

Table 3.2. Changes in the event trees for risk reduction alternatives 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3
Run-Case

Risk Reduction Alternative
3.1 – Spillway widening

Risk Reduction Alternative
3.2 – Raise main and
saddle dams

Modifications
Flood Event Tree
Level 1 PRE-AEP relationship modified
as shown in Figure 3.5 to represent
spillway widening
Level 2 Peak Stage – Peak Discharge
relationship modified as shown in
Figure 3.6 to represent spillway
widening
Level 1 PRE-AEP relationship modified
as shown in Figure 3.5 to represent
raising main and saddle dams

Level
2
Pool-Duration
relationship modified as
shown in Figure 3.12 to
represent raising main and
saddle dams

Level 2 Peak Discharge relationship
modified as shown in Figure 3.6 to
represent raising main and saddle dams

Level 4 Overtopping SRP
function modified to include
the new dam crest elevation
(679 ft.) to represent raising
main and saddle dams

Dam crest elevations increased by 6 ft.
in relational equations of Level 3 and
Level 4 to represent raising main and
saddle dams
Risk Reduction Alternative
3.3 – Raise saddle dam

Earthquake Event Tree
Level
2
Pool-Duration
relationship modified as
shown in Figure 3.12 to
represent spillway widening

Relational equation of Level 4 is
modified to include the new saddle dam
crest elevation (679 ft.)
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risk reduction alternatives, and risk reduction stages is presented in Figure 3.20. Total
annual probabilities of failure representing combined contributions of all the failure
modes included in the flood and earthquake event trees under each run case are plotted in

Total Annual Probability of Failure (/yr)
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Figure 3.20. Annual probability of failure
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Figure 3.20 a) and the percent contributions of each failure mode to the total APF are
presented in Figure 3.20 b). The total APF for the initial stage is estimated as 4.20x103

/year, where the saddle dam piping failure has a major contribution of about 89%. After

implementing the saddle dam berm and filter to address the piping failure mode in RRS
1, the total APF value is estimated to be reduced to 4.64x10-4 /year and the saddle dam
piping failure contribution falls down to 0.82%.
For RRS 1, the largest contributions come from the main dam piping along the
outlet works (about 59%) and the saddle dam overtopping (about 29%) failure modes.
The options to reduce the likelihood of these failures modes are considered in RRA 2.1
(repair the main dam outlet works) and RRA 2.2 (raise saddle dam). RRA 2.1 has a
greater impact on the estimated total APF and is selected as RRS 2. The estimated total
APF for RRS 2 is estimated to be reduced to 1.92x10-4/year, but this is higher than the
USACE APF tolerable risk limit value of 1.0x10-4 (i.e., 1 in 10,000)/year. Next RRA 3.1
(spillway widening), RRA 3.2 (raise main and saddle dams) and RRA 3.3 (raise saddle
dam) are evaluated. The total APF value is estimated to be reduced below the tolerable
risk limit guideline for RRA 3.1 and RRA 3.2, but not for RRA 3.3.
4.2. Annualized incremental life loss (ALL)
The totals of the estimated annualized incremental life loss for different run cases
are displayed in Figure 3.21 a), and the percent contributions of the various failure modes
to each total are shown in Figure 3.21 b).
After implementing the saddle dam berm and filter piping fix in RRS 1, the
contribution of the saddle dam piping failure to the total ALL is estimated to be reduced
from 66% to 0.19%, and the total ALL value, which is estimated as 1.68x10-1 lives/year

77

Total Annualized Incremental Life Loss
(lives/yr)

1.00E+00

1.00E-01

1.00E-02

1.00E-03

1.00E-04
Initial Stage

RRS1

RRA 2.1
Total

RRA 2.2

RRS 2

RRA 3.1

RRA 3.2

RRA 3.3

USACE Tolerable Risk Limit

a) Total annualized incremental life loss for all run cases
100%
OT Failure

Percent Contribution of Failure Modes

90%

SEC Failure

80%
70%

Saddle dam piping thru Embankment

60%

Saddle Dam Overtopping Failure

50%

Embankment Piping along Outlet Works
Failure

40%

Piping through Foundation Failure

30%
Piping through Embankment Failure

20%

Main Dam Overtopping Failure

10%

Instability Failure

0%
Initial
Stage

RRS1 RRA 2.1 RRA 2.2 RRS 2 RRA 3.1 RRA 3.2 RRA 3.3

b) Percent contribution of various failure modes to the total annualized incremental
life loss
Figure 3.21. Annualized incremental life loss
for the initial stage, is estimated to be reduced to 5.72x10-2 lives/year.
RRA 2.1 (repair main dam outlet works), which is implemented as RRS 2, is
estimated to give a greater reduction in the total ALL value than RRA 2.2 (raise saddle
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dam). The estimated total ALL value for RRS 2 is 1.49x10-3 lives/year, which is higher
than the tolerable risk limit value of 1.0x10-3 (0.001) lives/year. RRAs 3.1 (spillway
widening) and 3.2 (raise main and saddle dams) are estimated to reduce the total ALL but
not quite below the ALL tolerable risk limit value; whereas RRA 3.3 (raise saddle dam),
which showed a reduction in the total APF, is estimated to result in a slight increase in
the total ALL value compared with RRS 2. This demonstrates an adverse effect of
reducing the probability of the saddle dam safer because there is an increase in the
probability of failure of the main dam, which has higher life-loss consequences compared
with the saddle dam. RRA 3.1 or RRA 3.2 could be selected to be implemented as RRS 3
following RRS 2 in the DAMRAE project hierarchy and further risk reduction
alternatives, perhaps non-structural in nature, could be evaluated.
4.3. USACE tolerable risk guidelines charts
F-N charts developed for different run cases are shown in Figure 3.22 for
evaluation of the USACE societal risk limit guideline. Figure 3.22 a) shows the F-N
curves for the initial stage and the two risk reduction stages, where only RRS 2 meets the
USACE societal risk limit guideline. Similarly, Figure 3.22 b), which shows the F-N
curves for RRS 2 and the three subsequent risk-reduction alternatives [RRA 3.1 (spillway
widening), RRA 3.2 (raise main and saddle dams) and RRA 3.3 (raise saddle dam)],
indicates that all four cases displayed in the figure meets the USACE societal risk limit
guideline. The increase in life-safety risk for RRA 3.3 can be seen by comparison with
RRS 2 in Figure 3.22 b).
Non-breach F-N charts developed to evaluate the non-breach inundation risk are
shown in Figure 3.23. It is noted that showing the guidelines on these charts is only for
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reference purposes. Non-breach F-N curves for the initial stage and the two risk reduction
stages, shown in Figure 3.23 a), appear to be almost identical as there is only a slight
difference in non-breach probabilities and the peak discharge values on which the nonbreach consequences are dependent are similar for all the three cases. For the RRS 2 and
the three subsequent risk reduction alternatives [RRA 3.1 (spillway widening), RRA 3.2
(raise main and saddle dams) and RRA 3.3 (raise saddle dam)], the non-breach F-N
curves, shown in Figure 3.23 b), are more distinguishable from each other because the
peak discharge relationship and the threshold of the discharge value where the failure
occurs differs for each of these run cases. While RRA 3.2 lowers the total exceedance
probability of non-breach life loss (i.e. at N = 1), by raising both the main and saddle
dams, the range of non-breach life loss is expanded to a higher number of fatalities. This
increase in fatalities can be attributed to increased storage capacities of both the dams.
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Non-Breach Life Safety Inundation Risk Chart
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f-N Charts are shown in Figure 3.24 for total f-N pairs but not for individual
failure modes due to space constraints in this paper. The total f-N pairs for the initial and
two risk reduction stages are presented in Figure 3.24 a) and show that the USACE APF
and ALL tolerable risk limit guidelines are not met for all three run cases. The total f-N
pairs for RRS 2 and three subsequent risk reduction alternatives [RRA 3.1 (spillway
widening), RRA 3.2 (raise main and saddle dams) and RRA 3.3 (raise saddle dam)] are
presented in Figure 3.24 b) and show that RRA 3.1 and RRA 3.2 falls in a region where
the tolerable APF limit guideline is met but the ALL limit guideline is not met, indicating
that there may be justification for the further risk reduction.
4.4. Cost effectiveness, disproportionality and benefit:cost ratio evaluation
The quantitative measures of ALARP evaluation of Cost to Save a Statistical Life
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(CSSL) and Disproportionality Ratio (R) are calculated by DAMRAE for each of the risk
reduction stages and alternatives included in a project. Also, Benefit:Cost ratios (BCR)
are calculated for each of the risk reduction stages and alternatives. Table 3.3 lists the
estimated values for CSSL, R and BCR. It is to be noted that the CSSL and R values are
displayed as N.A. (not applicable) if the computed BCR value is negative for the
respective run cases.
Under the Tolerability of risk approach [2], risk reduction to the limit guidelines
is normally considered to be required regardless of cost. Therefore, these parameters are
normally considered only after the risk is reduced to the point where all the tolerable risk
limit guidelines are met, which is not achieved for ALL in this hypothetical example
project. If the values of CSSL and R for RRS 1 and RRA 2.1 (RRS 2) were obtained for
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Table 3.3. Values for economic evaluation and decision justification of risk reduction
measures
Description

Cost to Save a
Statistical Life
(CSSL) ($M/life)

Disproportionality
Ratio (R)

Benefit-toCost Ratio
(BCR)

RRS1

Saddle dam berm and filter

5.9

0.95

0.07

RRA 2.1
RRA 2.2
RRS 2
RRA 3.1
RRA 3.2
RRA 3.3

Main dam outlet works
Saddle dam raise
Main dam outlet works
Spillway widening
Main and saddle dam raise
Saddle dam raise

5.1
N.A.
5.1
6,800
8,100
N.A.

0.81
N.A.
0.81
1,100
1,300
N.A.

0.19
-1.02
0.19
0.05
0.03
-1.02

Run Case

cases where all limit guidelines were already met, these values are small enough to
indicate a strong case for proceeding with further risk reduction, whereas the large values
obtained for RRA 3.1 and RRA 3.2 indicate a very poor case for proceeding with risk
reduction. Again it is emphasized that these cost effectiveness and disproportionality
measures would not normally be consider for any of these cases since the limit guidelines
are not already met.

5. Concluding remarks
The hypothetical example dam safety risk assessment presented in this paper
demonstrates the DAMRAE functionalities. The example illustrates flood and earthquake
event trees for various failure modes for two dams forming the same reservoir
considering a full range of loading. Non-mutually exclusive failure modes are handled
through the calculation options available in DAMRAE for common-cause adjustment and
SRP and consequences freezing. The earthquake risk model presented here does not
explicitly include the liquefaction and instability events in the event tree structure as the
liquefaction and stability analyses are combined within the FLAC [4] model that was
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used to estimate the vertical crest deformation relationship used in Level 3 of the
earthquake event tree.
Following the assessment of the existing dam baseline condition, various risk
reduction measures are evaluated by adding new run cases in the DAMRAE project
hierarchy. Due to the space constraints, only a few example outputs of DAMRAE are
presented in this paper. However, DAMRAE generates detailed outputs for each of the
event trees under various run cases, which are combined and compared to evaluate the
risk reduction measures.
The efficiency and flexibility with which dam safety risk assessment can be
performed using the DAMRAE software is in contrast to the use of spreadsheets or
commercial software that is developed for primarily for business applications and not
well suited for the needs of dam safety risk assessment as discussed in Chapter 1.
This particular hypothetical example highlights the following observations:
a) If the failure of main and saddle dams are considered in the risk assessment as
competing with each other (i.e., non-mutually exclusive events), any attempt
to reduce the risk for one of these dams and not the other could result in a
higher risk for the other dam.
b) Another form of the first observation is that for the non-mutually exclusive
failure modes in an event tree, any risk reduction measure implemented to
address a particular failure mode reduces the probability for that failure mode
but redistributes the decreased amount of probability to other failure modes.
Therefore, a risk reduction measure that reduces the total APF and the APF of
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a particular failure mode could increase the APF of another failure mode and
hence, could increase the annualized consequences for the other failure mode.
c) The flood failure and non-breach inundation cases are complementary events.
Efforts to reduce the failure probability increase the non-breach inundation
probability, with a resulting effect on the probability of non-breach inundation
consequences that should be carefully assessed.
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CHAPTER 4
UNCERTAINTY IN DAM SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT – THEORETICAL
CONCEPTS AND A DEVELOPED FRAMEWORK

ABSTRACT
Based on a generalized event tree algorithm, a deterministic event tree based risk
model referred to as DAMRAE was developed for dam safety risk assessment.(see Chapters 2
and 3.)

With the objective of incorporating an uncertainty analysis functionality in

DAMRAE, we review various aspects and requirements of uncertainty analysis in the
context of dam safety risk assessment, and extend the DAMRAE framework to develop a
generic risk and uncertainty analysis tool, DAMRAE-U, for dam safety risk assessment.
DAMRAE-U is structured to represent knowledge uncertainty for the event tree variables
and natural variability associated with flood and earthquake loading. It also provides for
separating the effects of uncertainty in the existing condition of the dam system on which
the event tree model is dependent and representing this source of uncertainty in a logic
tree. In this paper, we review the background for uncertainty analysis in dam safety risk
assessment and present the details of the DAMRAE-U computational framework.

1. INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic risk assessment of a dam system is commonly based on the event
tree form of risk model. A generalized computational framework, known as DAMRAE,
was developed by the authors to support the deterministic form of event tree
calculations.(see Chapters 2 and 3) The word ‘deterministic’ is used in the sense that the branch
probabilities and state values assigned to different branches in the event tree are either
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fixed values or non-stochastic relationships. The natural variability (aleatory uncertainty)
in the outcomes of random events (state variables), such as flood inflow to a reservoir,
seismic ground acceleration, spillway gate reliability, the likelihood and extent of
spillway plugging with debris, population exposure scenarios, and the timing of warning
and evacuation, can be represented by branches emanating from a node on the event tree.
However, the presence of knowledge (epistemic) uncertainty associated with probabilities
associated with the various branches is omitted in the deterministic approach. Sometimes
reasonable best estimate values, as judged by subject matter experts, are used but in other
cases it may be appropriate to use somewhat conservative values in a deterministic form
of event tree analysis when significant uncertainty is recognized, especially at a screening
level. Sensitivity analysis may be useful in the situation where only determinism analysis
is being used to explore the effects of the range of uncertainty and its effect on decision
making.
The deterministic event tree analysis in DAMRAE generates the risk estimates in
various forms including annual risk estimates (probability of dam failure and expected
values of life-loss and economic consequences) and graphical displays such as charts for
evaluating USACE tolerable risk guidelines charts: F-N charts5 displaying exceedance
frequency (≥) – incremental life-loss estimates; F-$ charts displaying exceedance

5

The F-N chart, which is an annual probability of exceedance of life loss (F) versus the
incremental life loss (N) plot, is commonly known in the literature (1,2) as the “risk
curve”. For a particular life-loss level (say n) on the abscissa, the ordinate corresponds to
the frequency with which the life-loss level n or greater (≥) is estimated to occur;
although the literature is not entirely consistent and sometimes the ordinate represents the
frequency that the life-loss level n is estimated to be exceeded (>). We have adopted the
more conservative ≥ convention in our work. In the deterministic form of event tree
analysis, the natural variability included in the event tree model defines the extent of the
curve on both the axes.
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frequency (≥) – economic consequences; and ƒ-N charts displaying annual probability of
failure vs. an estimate of life loss as a weighted average over failure modes and exposure
scenarios.
In case of a risk analysis of risk reduction options, additional decision variables
such as Risk Reduction Benefits, Risk Reduction Cost, Benefit:Cost Ratio, Cost to Save a
Statistical Life (CSSL), and Disproportionality Ratio (R) are also calculated as described
in Chapter 2.
The Office of Management and Budget

(3)

has emphasized the important of

properly accounting for uncertainties in conducting risk analyses to justify federal
government decisions and expenditures. Referring to the six levels of analytical
sophistication in risk analysis that were suggested by Paté-Cornell (2), the “deterministic”
DAMRAE framework is classified as a Level 4 analysis. Our objective in this paper is to
extend the DAMRAE computational framework to a Level 5 analysis which includes
explicit probabilistic characterization of knowledge (epistemic) uncertainties associated
with various branch inputs, such as loading and system response probabilities and
consequences. In Section 2 we explore the conjunction between dam safety and risk and
uncertainty analysis, and provide an overview of uncertainty analysis. In Section 3, a
classification structure to identify the uncertain variables in dam safety risk analysis is
proposed. In Sections 4, the generic extended theoretical framework is described. The
framework is referred to as DAMRAE-U, to efficiently characterize, propagate, and
display the outcomes of uncertainty analysis based on event tree modeling. The paper
closes with a summary and conclusions section. The Chapter 5 contains an example
application of DAMRAE-U to a hypothetical dam.
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2. DAM SAFETY AND RISK AND UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS
Risk and uncertainty are ubiquitous terms in a variety of fields spanning from
psychology to the space shuttle, and therefore, unsurprisingly, many definitions of these
terms and views about their relationship appear in the literature. However, in the context
of engineering applications, a common notion is to accept risk and uncertainty as
dependent terms.(4) In a quantitative sense, risk is defined as a triplet set of scenario,
likelihood, and consequence (

, ,

),(1) and uncertainty is inevitably involved in

the assessment of all three elements.
Uncertainty analysis is viewed as a means of quantifying or estimating the degree
of confidence in risk analysis outputs based on characterizing the principal sources of
uncertainty in the analysis inputs.(5) An appropriate treatment of uncertainty in risk
quantification is also considered to be important to support decision making that is
informed by the results of risk analysis.(6-8) The same conjunction between risk and
uncertainty applies to the dam safety field; although there are very few practical
examples of the use of formal uncertainty analysis in dam safety risk assessment that can
be found in the literature.(8,9)
The risk associated with dam failure is quantified by developing event tree models
for the significant risk scenarios. For dam safety, these scenarios are typically defined
following the general source-pathway-receptor approach as proposed by Rowe
adapted for dam safety by Bowles et al.

(11)

(10)

and

Sources include external (e.g. flood or

earthquakes) or internal initiating events (e.g. internal erosion) that can threaten the safety
of a particular dam. Pathways include the response of the particular reservoir-damfoundation system to external and internal initiating events, the outcomes of those
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responses, including normal operation or dam failure, and the routing of non-breach and
failure floods downstream of the dam to the location of receptors or via other nonphysical pathways such as those applying to financial or reputation consequences of dam
failure for the dam owner. Exposure factors that represent whether or not receptors will
be present to be exposed to the non-breach or failure conditions are commonly included
in the pathways. Receptors include the people, physical objects and other entities or
systems that can be affected by the failure of a dam, where the consequences of dam
failure are typically considered to be incremental in the sense of the increase in the
magnitude of consequences over those that would occur without dam failure (e.g. flood
damages due to normal operation of a spillway that may release large flows through an
urban area).
An event tree is a graphical model, which can be represented in a general
symbolic form as
,

,

,

,

, where

,

,

,… ,

,

,

, … and

, … are vectors of state variables that are represented by event tree

branches, probabilities of the state variables taking on various values, and the
consequence values associated with each vector of state values, respectively. The
conditional probabilities and consequence values that are represented by event tree
branches are generally functions of state values for preceding branches in the event tree.
Uncertainty is intrinsic to all three types of inputs ( ,

and ) in an event tree

model. In engineering contexts, uncertainty is often broadly classified into two categories
as Aleatory (natural variability) or Epistemic (knowledge) uncertainty.

(4)

Aleatory

uncertainty arises from the inherently random character of a variable in the real physical
world, whereas knowledge uncertainty derives from the lack or absence of adequate
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knowledge to assess the underlying phenomena associated with the variable. In addition,
knowledge uncertainty is often increased by deliberate choices of model simplification,
constraints on available sampling (observations), and various errors associated with
measurements and modeling. As mentioned before, aleatory uncertainty in loading
variables in dam safety risk analysis is commonly modeled as an initiating event in the
event tree structure, but the representation of knowledge uncertainty is much less
commonly included. Some researchers support the probabilistic approach as the most
logical and sufficient methodology for addressing the knowledge uncertainty

(6, 12-15)

,

while others propose alternate approaches, such as fuzzy set theory, evidence theory,
possibility theory, probability bounds, interval analysis, and various combinations of such
theories.(16-20) However, the probabilistic approach to characterizing epistemic
uncertainties offers the most intuitive and practical approach for application in the dam
safety field.
In addition to the above, another source of uncertainty that can affect dam safety
is policy uncertainty. This is defined by NAP (21) as “uncertainty with respect to a course
of action means that a plan is not determined or is undecided.” Examples of this type of
uncertainty can include decisions that will be made about factors that affect population
growth that will affect the size of the population at risk and hence the magnitude of dam
failure consequences. We do not address policy uncertainty in this paper, except to
suggest that an effective way to consider it is through scenario modeling in which
alternatives policy outcomes are considered and their effect on dam-safety decisions are
evaluated.
Considering the input uncertainties, the event tree representation can be modified
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as

,

| ,

,

, where

and

represent the knowledge uncertainties and

natural variability, respectively. In the deterministic DAMRAE version,
explicitly considered in DAMRAE calculations and single state values,

is not
, are

considered as representative values to obtain point values of the risk estimates. The basic
risk estimates obtained from an event tree quantification are probabilities of dam failure
,

(

,

, … ) and corresponding annualized incremental failure consequences
,

(life loss or economic consequence) (
modes

,

,

,

, … ) for the potential failure

, … included in the event tree. A general formulation to calculate the

annual probability of failure and annualized consequences for a particular failure mode
( ) can be given as follows:
| ,

,…,

.
where

…4.2

is the probability assigned to a branch at level ‘ ’ in the event tree (

the failure consequence value per event (

…4.1

),

, c is

is the non-breach consequence value

for the respective event, and the summation over ‘ ’ takes place over the natural
variability range of the end node probabilities (

included in the event tree. The

aleatory range represents an inclusive set of all the possible combinations of the random
states of the state variables that are represented by the branches in the event tree model.
The pairs of

,

for each state

are collected to generate the risk curve.

Under the probabilistic approach, the knowledge uncertainty of a state variable is
characterized using a probability distribution rather than a point value as is the case for
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the deterministic approach. These distributions are estimated on the basis of the available
empirical information combined with expert opinion and judgment. The assigned
distributions are propagated through the event tree model to determine the distributions of
the risk estimates. The uncertainty propagation step is performed using a stochastic
simulation method such as Monte Carlo. The Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) approach is
commonly used as an efficient approach for such a purpose

(19, 22)

and we develop our

generic computational framework based on the same approach. The outcome
distributions of the risk estimates can be presented as a cumulative distribution function
(CDF) or as a complimentary cumulative distribution function (CCDF), which is more
suitable for the decision making for dam safety.

3. ANALYSIS CLASSIFICATION STRUCTURE
Dam safety risk analysis is an integrated procedure which logically synthesizes
the engineering performance aspects of a dam-reservoir system and its surroundings to
obtain quantitative risk estimates over the full range of credible and significant external
and internal hazards. This analysis is useful for evaluating existing risks and for justifying
and prioritizing technical and monetary resources for risk reduction and improved risk
management in the context in which the dam is owned and operated. In Figure 4.1 we
propose an uncertainty analysis classification structure comprising initial uncertainty, risk
estimation uncertainty and decision justification uncertainty.
3.1. Initial Uncertainty
The evaluation of future performance of a dam system is conditioned upon the
state or condition of the dam system at the present time and the characteristics (such as
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Figure 4.1. Analysis classification structure for dam safety risk assessment
frequency and severity) of a peril that could unexpectedly occur in a future time. The
uncertainty associated with these two conditions is designated as Initial Uncertainty.
Important aspects of the uncertainty about the existing condition of a dam system
can be included in an uncertainty analysis using a Logic Tree that precedes the event tree.
Thus the logic tree represents the initial uncertain states on which the system response
relationships represented in the event tree structure are dependent.(23) The logic tree
branches can represent different uncertain properties or flaws associated with, for
example, the embankment fill material (e.g., erosion, seepage, saturation, burrows or root
holes, etc.), foundation material (e.g., compaction, seepage, etc.), dam structure or its
appurtenances (e.g., cracks, spalling and pop-outs, condition of valve or gates, spillway
plugging, etc.), and the relevant maintenance, operation and performance history. The
initial characterization of such properties and flaws is subject to uncertainty due to the
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variations in geology, soil and hydraulic properties, and various technical and analytical
limitations involved in their assessment. An uncertainty variable included as a logic tree
branch could be aleatory (e.g., moisture content of the embankment material, blanket
thickness, SPT (Standard Penetration Test)

(24)

blow counts for the foundation material,

etc.) or epistemic (e.g., extent of cracking at the structure-foundation interface, seepage
location and condition, etc.), or a combination of aleatory and epistemic. Uncertainties
can be specified using a deterministic sensitivity analysis approach (e.g., flaw-no flaw,
degrees of flaw) or characterized using a probability distribution.
The flood and earthquake initiating events are commonly characterized in the
event tree model using a cumulative probability distribution of annual exceedance
probability (AEP) vs. peak reservoir elevations (PRE) or peak ground accelerations
(PGA). The distribution encompasses the aleatory uncertainty, i.e., the entire range of
inflow flood events or possible earthquake events. Separate distributions can be
developed for different flood generating mechanisms (e.g. snow melt or convective
storms) and for different earthquake magnitude ranges. These distributions are developed
within the realm of technical and scientific procedures and their associated limitations,
which include knowledge uncertainty such as measurement errors, model selection error,
parameter selection error, data uncertainty, and operational uncertainty. (25-28) To account
for the knowledge uncertainty, probability distributions for PRE or PGA can include
confidence intervals as illustrated in Figure 4.2 a and b, respectively.
3.2. Risk Estimation Uncertainty
The fundamental steps within the risk estimation level are as follows: a)
Estimation of the chance of failure of a dam system in future performance due to various
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Figure 4.2. Example knowledge uncertainty distributions on Flood (PRE-AEP) and
Earthquake (PGA-AEP) loadings
existing conditions within the dam system (e.g. defects) or externally imposed loads that
exceed the dam system capacity, and b) Estimation of the downstream and other
consequences (e.g., property damage, monetary loss, life loss, loss of services, etc.) of
dam failure.
The estimation of dam system failure probability is based on the system response
or fragility curves. In simple scenarios, a system response relationship, developed for a
specific failure mode, such as overtopping or internal erosion, directly relates the
conditional probability of the dam system failure to the initiating event. However often,
in complicated scenarios, system response probabilities (SRPs) are function of various
intermediate state variables. Some examples of the state variables, which are frequently
used in the event tree models, are vertical and horizontal deformation of the dam crest in
response to an earthquake; and percent spillway plugging and debris blockage, number of
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operating spillway gates, overtopping depth, and peak discharge for floods.
After defining the existing condition of the dam system and the initiating event,
the event tree model is continued with adjoining the branches to represent the relevant
state variables that characterize each significant failure modes. The epistemic uncertainty
associated with SRPs for each state variable, such as percentage spillway plugging or
number of functional spillway gates, can be structured in the event tree model itself using
multiple branches, or alternatively, discrete probability distributions could be assigned for
these variables. Similar to the AEP curves of the initiating event, SRP relationship curves
with uncertainty bounds are input to the event tree model.
The event tree model is further extended, after the failure level, to structure the
consequence assessment level of the analysis. The consequence part of the event tree
(also, referred to as consequence sub-tree (23)) includes branches to represent the exposure
cases for characterizing the temporal variation in the presence of people or other objects
or entities for a dam failure or no-failure scenario, and b) the consequence estimates for
failure mode-exposure scenarios. The exposure cases are considered as model domain
parameters,6 and are included in the event tree model as multiple discrete branches to
represent the seasonal (e.g., winter and summer), diurnal (e.g., day and night), hourly, or
any other possible exposure cases. The selections of consequence types and consequence
areas (or impact zones) are also model domain parameters, but they are not treated as
uncertain parameters. Their selection is site-specific and depends on the requirements for

6

Morgan and Henrion (29) define the model domain parameters as “Model domain
parameters specify the domain or scope of the system being modeled, generally by
specifying the range and increments for index variables”. In case of dam risk assessment,
exposure cases controls the temporal detail of the downstream consequences and
therefore, are considered as model domain parameters.

97
decision making. The consequence values, which are assigned to the consequence
branches in the event tree, come from an external flood inundation model of the
downstream area. The flood inundation modeling has its own inherent uncertainties
arising from uncertainties in breach formation time and geometry, topographic
representation, hydraulic parameters and modeling techniques, and geospatial operations.
These uncertainties are included in the event tree model, as part of the uncertainties in the
estimates of consequence using suitable probability distributions that are assigned to the
consequence branches.
3.3. Decision Justification Uncertainty
For the base (or existing) case risk analysis, the outputs obtained from the risk
estimation level are used as decision variables. The basic decision that is to be made is
whether or not the dam is adequately safe in its existing condition and with its existing
operational and risk management regime. This decision should not be the automatic result
of applying decision criteria to the evaluation of estimates obtained from a risk
analysis.(30) However, decision guidelines, including tolerable risk guidelines (TRG) for
judging the significance of life-safety risk can play an important role in informing the risk
evaluation and subsequent decision-making process. From a technical perspective, the
outcome of the dam safety risk assessment process is to recommend and make a case for
or justification for a decision.
Tolerable risk guidelines for dam safety have been developed by various
organizations, including the Australian Committee of Large Dams,
Reclamation

(32)

and US Army Corps of Engineers.

(33)

(31)

Bureau of

Typically, in countries with a

common law legal system, these guidelines follow a two-part evaluation process as
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established by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The first part compares total
estimated risk for all failure modes against the tolerable risk limits for Individual Risk
(IR) expressed as a probability of life loss for the identifiable person(s) most at risk and
for Societal Risk (SR) expressed as a limit of tolerability line on an F-N chart. Variations
of TRG used for dam safety also consider tolerable risk limits for Annual Probability of
Failure (APF) as a measure of the performance of the dam and Annualized Life Loss
(ALL) as the expected value or average annual magnitude of life loss from the probability
distribution of life loss for Societal Risk in the F-N chart.
The second part of the risk evaluation process is a determination of whether risks
have been reduced to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). This evaluation is
both qualitative and quantitative in nature and typically, it should take the following into
account:

(36)

the level of risk in relation to the tolerable risk limits; the disproportion

between the sacrifice (money, time, trouble and effort) in implementing the riskreduction measures and the subsequent risk reduction achieved; the cost-effectiveness of
the risk-reduction measures; compliance established good dam safety practice; and
societal concerns as revealed by consultation with the community and other stakeholders.
To conduct an ALARP evaluation requires that practical options for reducing the risk
through structural and non-structural means are identified and evaluated.
The consideration of the cost effectiveness or “disproportionality” associated with
the cost of achieving life-safety risk reduction relative to the life-safety benefit achieved
is a quantitative aspect of an ALARP evaluation. This introduces the consideration of
cost, but only to justify further incremental risk reduction below the tolerable risk limits,
and not to justify achieving those limits in the first place. Hence, there is normally no
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consideration of a “balancing” of the economic impacts of operating restrictions and the
reductions in life-safety risk in meeting the tolerable risk limits.
Therefore in case of a risk analysis of risk reduction options, additional decision
variables such as Risk Reduction Benefit, Risk Reduction Cost, Benefit:Cost Ratio, Cost
to Save a Statistical Life (CSSL), and Disproportionality Ratio (R) are considered. The
calculation of these variables utilizes the annual risk estimates, and other quantities, such
as project life, cost of risk reduction, incurred operation and maintenance cost, discount
rate, and willingness to pay (WTP) for life-safety risk reduction,7 as inputs. The project
life is a model domain parameter as it defines the life span of a dam over which the
monetary expenses and accrued benefits are estimated, and hence, is not considered as an
uncertain quantity. Other input quantities (different costs, discount rate, and WTP) are
value parameters8 to the analysis. In dam safety risk analysis, these values are used for a
comparison of different risk reduction alternatives and therefore, their approximate or
projected values are usually assigned by the risk analyst. Moreover, if required,
sensitivity analysis could be performed to explore the sensitivity of these value
parameters.
The variable classification proposed in Figure 4.1 and described above is intended
to aid the investigation and identification process of critical uncertain variables that are
involved in various steps of the risk analysis. In the framework that we propose in this
paper the initial, risk estimation and decision justification uncertainties are not treated as
three disjoint steps but rather as an integrated approach to an uncertainty analysis for a

7

Often referred to as value for saving a life (VSL) (e.g., USDOT (34))
“Value parameters represent aspects of the preferences of the decision makers or the
people they represent.” – Morgan and Henrion.(29)
8
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dam safety risk assessment. However, if it is desired to perform the uncertainty
quantification in separate steps it would be essential to consider the interdependencies
among various components and uncertain variables involved in the different steps and a
framework such as that proposed by Gouldby et al. (35) may be considered.

4. DAMRAE-U COMPUTATIONAL FRAMEWORK
In the deterministic computational framework of DAMRAE, which is shown
schematically in the top part of Figure 4.3, single point estimates, X

x ,X

x ,…

(X , X , … X ) of state variables such as flood or earthquake loading, system response
relationships and consequences, along with other fixed inputs (
elevation), are processed through the event tree model

,

) (e.g., dam crest
to obtain the point

estimates of the annual probability of failure (APF), annualized life loss (ALL),
annualized economic consequences (AEC), maximum and minimum values of life loss
(R LL ) and economic consequences (R EC ). Also, single traces in the F-N chart are
generated to compare against the tolerable societal risk limit guidelines. (33)
In DAMRAE-U, this deterministic computational framework is enclosed within a
generalized Monte Carlo simulation framework. DAMRAE input features are extended to
allow definition of parametric or empirical forms of probability distributions for the
uncertain variables and to assign the correlation among those variables. The
computational framework of DAMRAE-U is framed to provide alternatives forms of
uncertainty analysis simulation as described in the following two subsections and
represented schematically in parts a) – b) of Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3. Simulation options in DAMRAE and DAMRAE-U
4.1. Event Tree Simulation
Parametric (e.g., Uniform, Normal, Triangular, etc.) or other user-specified or
empirical forms of probability distributions (

,

,

, …) are assigned by the user to

characterize the uncertain variables in the event tree. Using those distributions, correlated
samples of the uncertain variables are generated using the Latin Hypercube sampling
technique. Each set of the correlated samples is iteratively propagated through the event
tree model to generate risk estimates and an F-N curve corresponding to each sample.
The samples of the risk estimates are collected and further processed to generate the
percentile curves as CDFs. The percentile curves for the F-N risk curve are obtained by
collecting the samples of exceedance frequency (F) for a predefined set (bins) of life-loss
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(N) values. A schematic of Event Tree simulation is shown in Figure 4.3.a.
4.2 Logic Tree – Event Tree Simulation
Risk assessment of a dam system is basically an assessment of its future
performance. This assessment is conditioned upon the existing state of the dam system
and uncertainty about what that state is, such as uncertainty about the existence of a flaw
(e.g., hydraulic fractures in the embankment due to cross valley arching (36)) which could
initiate internal erosion. To incorporate uncertainty about such existing conditions in the
analysis, the Logic Tree can be used in front of the event tree. The logic tree structure can
be used to represent the uncertain existing states on which the system response
relationships represented in the event tree structure are dependent. (23, 37)
The concept of logic tree used here is a widely recognized tool to quantify and
incorporate knowledge uncertainty in the field of probabilistic seismic hazard analysis
(PSHA).(38) Different sources of knowledge uncertainty (e.g., alternative models or
alternative parameter values) which lead to different sets of inputs for the hazard analysis
model are included in different levels of the logic tree where each uncertainty source
could either take a form of discrete branches with weights (or confidence of the analyst)
assigned to each branch or it could be represented using a continuous distribution. Similar
application of logic trees can be used for the dam safety risk analysis where the existing
state uncertainty can be represented in the logic tree. Logic trees and event trees can also
be used to separate knowledge uncertainty and natural variability (e.g., Bowles et al.

(8)

)

or to make other types of distinctions but in this paper we limit ourselves using the logic
tree to representing uncertainty in the existing state of the dam system.
Each logic tree branch in DAMRAE-U either represents an uncertain variable
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(

) or an uncertain fixed quantity (

). All reasonably possible combinations of

the values for the logic tree variables (

), included in different levels of the logic tree

,

model (

), form the possible existing system states (

event tree model [
model

,

,

]. An uncertain variable (

,

1,2,3. ..) for the

), included in a logic tree

to represent a particular current state, could exhibit natural variability

(e.g., moisture content of the embankment material, blanket thickness, etc.) or knowledge
uncertainty (e.g., extent of cracking at the structure-foundation interface, seepage location
and condition, etc.), or a combination of both. Based on the method used to specify the
inherent uncertainty in the logic tree variables, the following three types of simulation
options are provided in DAMRAE-U.
4.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis
Uncertainties in the logic tree or event tree variables can be represented by
bounding values (e.g., flaw-no flaw, reasonable minimum and maximum extent of a flaw)
using a deterministic sensitivity analysis approach in which the deterministic event tree
model is run with each of the bounding values one at a time or with combinations of
bounding values for more than one variable. Sensitivity analysis can be used as a
preparatory step in preparing for an uncertainty analysis to provide insights to help guide
the process of selecting which variables to treat as uncertain variables and which are
appropriately considered as deterministic variables. Where there is little sensitivity for all
key decision variables to changing a variable across the entire range of uncertainty
represented by bounding values, then that variable can be treated as a deterministic
variable. By minimizing the number of variables that are treated as uncertain variables
the computational time needed to complete uncertainty analyses can be kept to a
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minimum.
4.2.2. Aggregated Uncertainty Analysis (Type I)
The uncertainty associated with the logic tree variables ( ) defines the
knowledge uncertainty about the existing states, whereas the uncertainty associated with
the event tree variables (

) represents other sources of knowledge uncertainty in the

event tree model. Also natural variability is included in the event tree as explained in
Section 1.0. Parametric or empirical probability distributions,

,

, … and

,

,

,…

, can be assigned to characterize the significant uncertain variables associated with the
logic tree and event tree variables, respectively. A schematic of Type I simulation is
shown in Figure 4.3.b. In this type of simulation, both the existing condition and other
sources of knowledge uncertainties are treated in a single phase of a Monte Carlo
simulation. For each iteration of a Monte Carlo simulation, a set of
from the

,

values is sampled

, … distributions in the logic tree and correspondingly, a set of

sampled from the

,

,

values is

, … distributions in the event tree. Using these sampled

values for the uncertain variables, event tree outcomes are quantified. A large number of
iterations are usually performed to obtain the desired level of numerical precision in the
outcomes. Although the event tree outcomes of each iteration correspond to a particular
existing condition state, their distinguishable identity is lost in the collective population
obtained from the simulation. Therefore, each percentile curve, generated by processing
the risk estimates from all iterations, represents an aggregated form of knowledge and
existing condition uncertainties. The horizontal extent of the percentile curve represents
the combination of the existing condition uncertainty and the other sources of knowledge
uncertainty as illustrated by the thick line in Figure 4.4.
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4.2.3. Disaggregated Uncertainty Analysis (Type II)
Type II simulation provides the capability of separating the existing condition
uncertainty represented in a logic tree from the knowledge uncertainty represented in an
event tree. A schematic of this simulation is shown in Figure 4.3.c. Similar to Type I
simulation, this simulation also includes both the logic tree
tree

,

,

and event

models, but the respective knowledge uncertainties in these models are

treated in separate nested layers of a two-phase Monte Carlo simulation. In the outer
layer, a set of values for the

variables in the logic tree is sampled, and

correspondingly, a population of set of values for the
sampled in the inner loop. The

variables in the event tree is

values sampled in the inner loop characterizes the full

knowledge uncertainty for each of the uncertain variables included in the event tree
corresponding to or conditioned on the existing condition state sampled in the outer loop.
Even though the

and

variables are sampled in two different loops, any correlation

between them can be specified and preserved. Multiple iterations of the outer loop are
performed, and for each iteration, the inner layer simulation outputs a set of the risk
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Aggregated Logic
Tree and Event
Tree knowledge
uncertainties
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Logic
tree
knowledge
uncertainty

Separate Logic
Tree and Event
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Figure 4.4. Percentile curves in DAMRAE-U
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estimates, which in turn gives a separate percentile curve for each of the outer loop risk
estimate as illustrated by a single dashed curve in Figure 4.4. Thus, the collective outputs
of the two-layer simulation are family of percentile curves for the risk estimates as shown
in Figure 4.4. Each percentile curve in the family represents the other knowledge
uncertainty conditioned on the sampled values of logic tree variables in the outer loop;
whereas the spread of the family of curves represents the existing condition uncertainty
for the logic tree variables.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The objectives of uncertainty analysis in dam safety risk assessment are to
quantify: a) the confidence levels in the risk estimates, and b) the degrees of confidence
with which tolerable risk and other guidelines are met. The deterministic version of
DAMRAE is extended in DAMRAE-U to accommodate these objectives. Functionality
to incorporate natural variability and knowledge uncertainty of the variables used in an
event tree risk model is included in DAMRAE-U. Additionally, uncertainty about the
existing conditions on which the event tree model is dependent can be represented in a
separate logic tree form of model. An event tree model, when coupled with a logic tree
model, can be analyzed for the following three options: a) Sensitivity analysis for the
existing condition estimates to identify their effects on risk estimates as a preliminary
step in uncertainty analysis; b) Aggregated uncertainty analysis to characterize the
combined effect of the existing condition uncertainty and the knowledge uncertainty in
the event tree model; and c) Disaggregated uncertainty analysis to separate the existing
condition uncertainty in the logic tree and other knowledge uncertainty in the event tree,
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and to identify the effects of the knowledge uncertainty for each of the possible existing
condition states.
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CHAPTER 5
DAMRAE-U APPLICATION FOR AN EXAMPLE DAM SAFETY RISK
ASSESSMENT WITH UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT
DAMRAE-U is a tool for performing the event tree based dam safety risk
assessment with uncertainty analysis. It allows the users to efficiently characterize,
propagate, and display the outcomes of uncertainty analysis in the risk assessment.
DAMRAE-U is structured to analyze the natural variability and knowledge uncertainty of
the event tree variables, as well as the effects of uncertainty in the existing condition of
the dam system on which the event tree model is dependent. The paper presents an
hypothetical example application to illustrate the inputs and outputs of DAMRAE-U, and
the implementation of tolerable risk evaluation incorporating uncertainty in risk
estimates.

1. INTRODUCTION
The computational framework of DAMRAE(1-3) supports the deterministic form
of event tree analysis where the branch probabilities and state values (branch inputs)
assigned to different branches in the event tree are either fixed values or deterministic
relationships (see also Chapter 2). This deterministic logic of DAMRAE is enclosed
within a generalized Monte Carlo simulation framework to develop the uncertainty
analysis version of DAMRAE, known as DAMRAE-U. DAMRAE input features are
extended to allow the definitions of parametric or empirical forms of probability
distributions for the uncertain variables and to assign the correlations among those
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variables. The computational framework of DAMRAE-U uses two types of component
models in the uncertainty analysis simulation: a) Event Tree Model, and b) Logic Tree
Model. The event tree form of risk model in DAMRAE-U is structured using six types of
event tree branches, which are defined in Table 5,1, and associated uncertain variables,
which are characterized using the parametric (e.g., Uniform, Triangular, Normal, etc.) or
other forms of user-specified or empirical probability distributions. In the logic tree –
event tree form of model, a logic tree precedes the event tree. The logic tree can be used
to represent the existing state of the dam system on which the event tree model is
dependent. The knowledge uncertainty about the existing state is represented in the logic
tree, whereas the natural variability and other sources of knowledge uncertainty are
represented in the event tree. This form of representation allows the following three types
of simulation options in DAMRAE-Ua) Sensitivity Analysis, where bounding values of uncertain variables (e.g.,

Table 5.1. Types of event tree branches in DAMRAE as described in Chapter 2
Branch Input
Probability
State Value

Branch Type

Description

Discrete

A discrete random variable that can take
on only a finite number of state values

Probabilities for
each discrete
state

Title of discrete
states for each
branch

Continuous

A continuous random variable that can
take on an infinite number of state values
over the specified range

Exceedance
probabilities
associated with
state values

Range of state
values

State Function

A deterministic relationship between
state variables

1.0

User-specified
relationship

Failure

The events of non-breach and the
occurrence of one or more failure modes

System response
probability (SRP)
value

Title of failure
mode

Exposure

Population exposure cases, e.g., summer
and winter; or day and night.

Exposure factor
as a time fraction

Title of exposure
factor

Consequences

Life-loss or economic consequences

Not applicable

Consequence value
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flaw-no flaw, reasonable minimum-maximum extent of a flaw) are analyses to
explore the sensitivity of risk estimates.
b) Aggregated Uncertainty Analysis (Type I), where the existing condition
knowledge uncertainties represented in the logic tree and the other knowledge
uncertainties and variabilities represented in the event tree are collectively
analyzed to obtain uncertainty distributions each type of risk estimate that
aggregate all modeled sources of knowledge uncertainty and variability in the
logic and event trees.
c) Disaggregated Uncertainty Analysis (Type II), this is a two-layer
simulation where the existing condition uncertainty is represented in the logic
tree separately from the other knowledge uncertainties, which are represented
in the event tree. For each type of risk estimate (e.g. probability of failure,
annualized life loss, benefit:cost ratio, cost per statistical life saved), a family
of uncertainty distributions is output, where each distribution incorporates the
variability and event tree knowledge uncertainty conditioned on a sampled
state of existing condition knowledge uncertainty, which is represented in the
logic tree. The spread across the family of uncertainty distributions represents
the disaggregated effect of the range of existing condition uncertainty.
An example risk assessment to illustrate the computational framework of
DAMRAE-U is presented in this paper. The details of the logic tree and event tree
models and their inputs are included in Section 2. The risk and uncertainty estimates
obtained from DAMRAE-U, the implementation of the tolerable risk evaluation
including uncertainty, and the additional insights gained by explicitly considering

114
uncertainty in the risk assessment are discussed in Section 3. The paper closes with a
summary and conclusions in Section 4.

2. EXAMPLE RISK MODEL
The hypothetical example is for a project that comprises a main embankment dam
and a saddle embanked dam. The example risk model, as shown in Figure 5.1, comprises
a single-level logic tree and a twelve-level event tree. The event tree part of the model
includes the following four flood and flood-internal failure modes in the failure branch in
Level 10: a) overtopping of the main dam, b) overtopping of the saddle dam, c) piping
through the abutment, and d) piping through the embankment. The uncertainty associated
with the threshold elevations at which the piping failure modes would be expected to
initiate is represented in the logic tree, whereas the other knowledge uncertainties
(associated with the peak inflow flood frequency relationship, system response
probabilities (SRPs) for the piping failure modes, and the consequences) and the natural
variability in inflows and gate reliability are included in the event tree model. The
different branches and their inputs are described in the following sections.
2.1. Logic Tree
An uncertain variable Lvar 1 is included under the logic tree branch to define
the uncertainty in the threshold peak pool reservoir elevation for the piping failure modes.
A parametric triangular distribution with 691.39 m as the best estimate is assigned to the
logic tree variable. The upper and lower uncertainty bounds on the triangular distribution

Figure 5.1. Example flood risk model

115

116
are judgmentally assigned as 1m above and below the best estimate. Graphically,
Lvar 1) represents the horizontal triangular distributions (shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure
5.3) which are used to characterize the system response probabilities (SRPs) for the
piping through the abutment and piping through the embankment failure modes.
2.2. Event Tree
A state function branch is included in Level 1 of the event tree to represent the
number of spillway gates that open on demand. This variability is represented using a
discrete probability distribution of r out of 5 total gates opening on demand assigned to
this branch. This distribution is listed in Table 5.2 and represents the independent failure
of each separate gate and a common cause failure of all five gates.
Level 2 is a state function branch that represents the Peak Inflow – Annual
Exceedance Probability (AEP) relationship. The AEP scale is transformed to z-variate to
represent a normal probability distribution plot (Figure 5.4). The knowledge uncertainty
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Table 5.2. Spillway gate reliability
Number of
Gates Failing
to Open at a
Time (r)
0
1
2
3
4
5

Gates Fail to
Open Case ID
(GID)
1
2
3
4
5
6

Total
Probability of
Failure to Open
of r Gates at a
0.894882
0.091314
0.003727
0.000076
0.000001
0.010000

associated with this relationship is defined using triangular distributions with the 50th
percentile or mode (best estimate), 5th and 95th percentile values for given AEP values as
shown in Figure 5.4. Using the assigned relationship as an input to this branch, a set of zvariate values corresponding to a given set of peak inflows, which are used to define the
peak reservoir stages, is interpolated as output of this branch.
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Peak stage (m)

Peak Inflow, Q (cms)

Level 3 is a continuous branch representing 40 intervals of annual exceedance
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Figure 5.5. Peak inflow - peak pool
elevation relationship for
different spillway gates fail
to open cases (GIDs)
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probability (AEP), ranging from (1 in 1.2) to (1 in 1.2x107). This spread of AEP values
covers the range of uncertainty in the flood loading. The AEP intervals are internally
calculated in DAMRAE-U to cover this range with one additional exceedance interval for
AEP < 1 in 1.2x107. The state value output is simply the corresponding z-variate
transformed value of the AEP.
The Peak Stage is calculated using the state function branch in Level 4 and
represents the peak elevation that the reservoir can attain for a given level of peak inflow
and a given number of spillway gates available. A peak inflow value is interpolated to
obtain the peak reservoir elevation (PRE) using the relationships between peak inflow
and peak stage shown in Figure 5.5) for each number of spillway gates failing to open.
For computational convenience of propagating the interval z-variate values in Level 3,
this relationship is assigned in terms of the z-variate (corresponding to peak inflows as
calculated in Level 2) and peak stage.
Peak inflow is calculated using the Level 5 state function branch (Inflow)
corresponding to the mid-point of a z-variate interval assigned in the Level 3 continuous
branch. This calculation utilizes the z-variate versus peak inflow relationship that is
obtained in Level 2.
Peak outflow is calculated using the Level 6 state function branch (Outflow)
corresponding to the peak inflow value calculated in Level 5. This calculation is based on
the approximate Peak Inflow-Peak Outflow relationships shown in Figure 5.6 the six
spillway gate availability cases specified in Level 1. The case when all gates are available
is represented in Figure 5.6 a by a one-to-one sloping line assuming that the peak outflow
is equal to the peak inflow. The other cases shown in Figures 5.6.b to f are represented by
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Figure 5.6. Approximate no-failure peak inflow – peak outflow relationships
a one-to-one sloping line drawn up to the point where the peak inflow reaches the
discharge capacity of the available gates. Beyond that, peak outflow remains at the same
level until the peak inflow reaches the dam crest elevation and then again, the
relationship follows the one-to-one sloping line. These relationships assume that there are
no other discharge facilities that are available. Peak outflow is needed for the calculation
of no-failure life loss and economic consequences, which are defined as a function of
peak outflow and are used for the calculation of incremental failure consequences.
Level 7 is a state function branch (Overtop Depth) in which the peak overtopping
depth is calculated by subtracting the dam crest elevation from the peak reservoir pool
elevation assigned in Level 4.
Levels 8 and 9 are state function branches included to define two uncertainty
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variables Svar 2 and Svar 3 , respectively, for uncertainty in the SRPs for the two
piping failure modes. Parametric triangular distributions are assigned to these variables as
shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 with vertical triangular distributions. The logic tree variable
Lvar 1 and state variable Svar 2 are used to characterize the SRP relationship for the
piping through the abutment failure, and similarly, Lvar 1 and Svar 3 variables are
used to characterize the SRP relationship for the piping through the embankment failure.
Level 10 is a group of failure branches representing the flood failure modes. The
conditional probability of occurrence of a failure mode is represented by its system
response probability. The main and saddle dams overtopping SRP relationships, which
are conditioned on peak reservoir overtopping depth (Level 7), are assigned as shown in
Figures 5.7.a and 5.7.b, respectively. SRPs for the piping failure modes, which are
dependent on peak reservoir elevation PRE (Level 4), are assigned in the form of the
conditional statements presented below in Eq. 5.1 and 5.2. These equations are used to
represent the SRP estimates obtained based on the USACE Internal Erosion toolbox

(4)

and are adjusted using expert elicitation. The steep parts of the relationships correspond
to the threshold peak reservoir elevation at which each failure mode is expected to
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Figure 5.7. Overtopping system response probabilities
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initiate, which is shown as a very small but non-zero value of the SRPs because semi-log
interpolation is used for these relationships. Each of these equations is a mathematical
representation of the SRP relationship that is sampled from the uncertainty distribution
defined using the logic tree variable Lvar 1 and state variables Svar 2 and Svar 3 .
Examples of the sampled relationship for piping through the abutment and piping through
the embankment failure modes are shown in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, respectively.
SRP Piping A
SRP Piping E

IF PRE

Lvar 1 , 1

IF PRE

Lvar 1

10
1, 1

, 10MIN
10

,

, 10MIN

,

…Eq. 5.1
,

,

…Eq. 5.2
where
8.94

PRE

Lvar 1

0.14

PRE

695

7.55

PRE

0.60

PRE

LOG

10

Svar 2

Lvar 1
695

1

1

LOG

1

10

Svar 3

The variable "PRE" used in Eq. 5.1 and 5.2 is the peak pool reservoir elevation
calculated in Level 4, Lvar 1 is a logic tree variable as defined in Section 3.1, and
Svar 2 and Svar 3 are state variables.
Levels 11 and 12 of the event tree contain the life-loss and economic
consequences branches, respectively. No exposure branches were included in this
simplified example. Different parametric triangular distributions are assigned to
characterize the uncertainty in the life-loss and economic consequences estimates
associated with no-failure and different failure modes as shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9.
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a) Main dam overtopping failure life loss b) Saddle dam overtopping failure life loss

c) Piping failure life loss

d) No-failure life loss

Figure 5.8. Life-loss consequences
2.3. Correlations
The uncertain variables

1 ,

2 and

3 are assumed to be mutually

independent and therefore, no correlation is assigned for these variables. The uncertainty
distributions assigned to form a synthetic realization of the Peak Inflow –AEP
relationship used in Level 2 are specified as perfectly correlated with each other and
hence sampled values of the uncertainty distributions for these relationships will
correspond to line of equal percentiles as illustrated by the dashed lines drawn on these
distributions. Similarly, the uncertainty distributions assigned to form the life-loss and
economic consequences in Level 11 and 12 are also specified as perfectly correlated for
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a) Main dam overtopping and piping
failure economic consequences

b) Saddle dam overtopping failure
economic consequences

c) Non-breach economic consequences
Figure 5.9. Economic consequences
each particular relationship.
2.4. Risk Reduction Measure
Installation of a full depth vertical cutoff wall into the foundation and into the
abutment is considered as a risk reduction measure to reduce the risk of piping failure.
The parameters of the state variables

2 and

3 are reduced by a factor of

100 to reflect the decrease in piping SRPs as a result of the risk reduction measure. The
similar uncertainty analysis simulations, as those were used for the base condition
analysis, were performed to generate the risk estimates for the risk reduction measure.
The risk estimates for the base condition and risk reduction measure are further compared

124
to generate the risk reduction estimates. In order to eliminate differences in synthetic
sampling errors between the two uncertainty simulations the same seed number was used
for both the base condition and risk reduction cases. (5)

3. UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS RESULTS
DAMRAE-U is used to perform the uncertainty analyses for the risk model shown
in Figure 5.1 and described in Section 2. For the Type I aggregated uncertainty analysis,
where the effects of the knowledge uncertainties associated with the piping thresholds in
the logic tree and other knowledge uncertainties in the event tree are combined, a
thousand Monte Carlo simulations were used to generate the uncertainty distributions of
the risk estimates and the various decision or risk evaluation variables (e.g., Benefit:Cost
ratio, cost to save a statistical life, etc.) for the risk reduction measure.
In the Type II disaggregated uncertainty analysis the knowledge uncertainties are
treated in two separate loops as described in Section 1. The outer loop for the logic tree
model, which represents the piping threshold uncertainty, was iterated hundred times, and
for each iteration of the outer loop, the inner loop containing the event tree with
additional knowledge uncertainties represented in addition to natural variability, was
iterated hundred times to collectively generate the families of probability distributions of
the risk estimates and the decision justification variables. Thus for each iteration of the
outer loop, the inner loop risk estimate are conditioned on the outer loop sampled values
of the piping threshold. Some uncertainty analyses results obtained for these simulations
are discussed and compared in the following subsections.
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3.1. Probability of Failure
The estimated uncertainty distributions for the total annual probability of failure
(APF) for Type I and Type II simulations are shown in Figures 5.10 and 5.11,
respectively. Figure 5.10 indicates a confidence level of about 98% that the dam in its
base condition meets the USACE APF tolerable risk limit of 1 in 10,000 /year. This
confidence level increases to close to 100% for the risk reduction measure.
For Type II simulation, families of uncertainty distributions for the estimated APF
for the base condition and risk reduction measure are shown in the top graphs of Figures
5.11 a) and b), respectively. The bottom graphs in these figures are conditional
distributions of uncertainty in the total APF the piping threshold uncertainty for the 95th
percentile level of knowledge uncertainty in the event tree estimates. For the base
condition, the lower percentiles on the top graph representing event tree knowledge
uncertainty indicate 100% confidence in meeting the APF TRG limit value of 1 in
10,000/year since the entire family of distributions is below the limit value. This
confidence level decreases for the higher percentiles on the top graph. For example, for
the 95th percentile the confidence level lowers to 98%. For the risk reduction case, a
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Figure 5.10. Uncertainty distributions of total probability of failure estimates from Type
I simulation.
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Figure 5.11. Uncertainty distributions for total probability of failure estimates from
Type II simulation.
100% confidence in meeting the USACE APF TRG limit is indicated for all the
percentile levels of knowledge uncertainty in the event tree.
3.2. Annualized Incremental Life Loss
The estimated uncertainty distributions for total annualized incremental life loss
(ALL) for the Type I and Type II simulations are shown in Figures 5.12 and 5.13,
respectively. The USACE ALL TRG limit value is defined as 0.001 lives/year. The Type
I simulation shows a 0% confidence in meeting the tolerable risk limit (or, in other
words, 100% confidence in failing to meet the tolerable risk limit) for the base condition.
This confidence level increases to about 80% for the risk reduction measure. For the
Type II simulation, again 0% confidence is indicated for all the percentiles of knowledge
uncertainty in the event tree as displayed in the top graph of Figure 5.13 a. For the risk
reduction measure (Figure 5.13 b), 100% confidence is displayed for the lower
percentiles (below 75th percentile) of peak inflow uncertainty whereas the confidence
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Figure 5.12. Uncertainty distributions of total annualized incremental life loss
estimates from Type I simulation.
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Figure 5.13. Uncertainty distributions for total annualized incremental life loss
estimates from Type II simulation.
level switches to 0% for the higher percentiles, such as for the 95th percentile shown in
Figure 5.13 b.
3.3. USACE Societal Risk Guidelines (F-N Chart)
The F-N charts developed for the base condition and risk reduction measure using
the Type I simulation are shown in Figures 5.14 a) and b), respectively. These charts
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Figure 5.14. F-N chart for selected percentiles of knowledge uncertainty from the
Type I simulation
display the F-N curves for the 5th, 50th (median), and 95th percentiles of knowledge
uncertainty included in the logic and event trees. For the base condition, only the 5th
percentile F-N curve appears to meet the tolerability limit, whereas all three percentile FN curves meet the societal risk guidelines limit for the risk reduction measure case.
Similar F-N charts can be developed for the Type II simulation also, where each
percentile of uncertainty in peak inflow will consist of multiple F-N curves conditioned
on selected percentiles of the uncertainty in the piping threshold.
The information portrayed via the F-N curves for the Type II simulation can
alternatively be represented in the plot shown in Figure 5.15 as the confidence of meeting
the societal risk limit guideline based on the knowledge uncertainty in the piping
thresholds for different percentiles of knowledge uncertainty included in the event tree.
The horizontal axis of the plot represents the percentile levels of knowledge uncertainty

Confidence in Meeting Societal Risk
Guidelines
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Figure 5.15. Confidence in meeting the USACE societal risk limit guideline based on the
knowledge uncertainty in the piping thresholds for different percentiles of
knowledge uncertainty included in the event tree for the Type II simulation
in the event tree and the vertical axis represents the confidence levels (%) as empirical
frequencies of meeting the societal risk limit guidelines for multiple F-N curves
corresponding to percentile levels on the horizontal axis. The confidence-percentile plot
shown in Figure 5.15 shows a 100% confidence in failing to meet the societal risk
guidelines limit for the base condition for all percentiles exceeding about the 10th
percentile, whereas the for risk reduction measure 100% confidence in meeting the
guidelines is indicated for almost all the percentile levels expect those exceeding about
the 95th percentile.
3.4. USACE APF and ALL Tolerable Risk Limit Guidelines (f-

Chart)

The f-N pairs obtained from the Type I simulation are plotted on the f-N chart9 as
shown in Figures 5.16 a) and b) for the base condition and risk reduction measure,
respectively. The f-N chart is divided into the following three regions shown with
9

f-N chart displays annual probability of failure vs. the average magnitude of life loss
from the probability distribution of life loss as a weighted average over failure modes and
exposure scenarios.
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Figure 5.16. f-N charts from Type I simulation with percentages of f-N pairs lying in
the three APF-ALL regions
shading, based on the USACE TRG limit values for APF and ALL: i) APF ≥ 1 in
10,000/year, ii) APF < 1 in 10,000/year and ALL ≥ 0.001 lives/year, and iii) APF < 1 in
10,000/year and ALL < 0.001 lives/year. The confidence levels displayed as percentages
in each region are calculated as percentage of simulations with f-N pairs lying in each of
these three regions. A higher confidence is shown that the risk of dam failure is in the
lower risk APF-ALL regions ii) and iii) for the risk reduction measure (Figures 5.16 b)
compared with the base condition (Figure 5.16 a).
For the Type II simulation, this information for the three APF-ALL regions is
displayed as confidence levels corresponding to different percentile levels of the
knowledge uncertainty in the piping initiation elevation represented in the logic tree
model. The confidence-percentile curve shown in Figure 5.17 a) for the base condition

Confidence as Percent Exceedance
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Figure 5.17. Percentile distributions of confidence of f-N pairs lying in the three APFALL regions from Type II simulation
indicates more than 94% confidence that the risk lies in the APF-ALL region ii) for all
percentile levels of the piping threshold uncertainty but very little confidence that it lies
in the lowest APF-ALL risk region iii) . For the risk reduction measure, the confidence of
the reduced level of risk lying in the APF-ALL region ii) is between 20% to 22%, and for
lying in the lowest risk APF-ALL region iii) it is more than 78%.

132
3.5. Economic Evaluation and Decision Justification
The estimated uncertainty distributions for cost to save a statistical life (CSSL)
and benefit:cost ratio are shown in Figures 5.18 and 5.19, respectively. CSSL is a
measure of cost effectiveness of reducing life safety risks that is one of several
considerations in evaluating the ALARP (as low as reasonably practical) principle for a
risk reduction measure.

(6-8)

Based on the magnitude of the CSSL value, following four

illustrative ALARP justification ratings: “Very Strong,” “Strong,” “Moderate,” and
“Poor” are assigned as shown in Figure 5.18 a) (Bowles (6)). For the Type I simulation the
risk reduction measure a more than a 93% confidence level of a “Poor” ALARP
justification rating is estimated with CSSL > $205M as indicated in Figure 5.18 a). For
the Type II simulation there is estimated to be a 100% confidence of “Poor” ALARP
justification rating for the example 95th percentile of knowledge uncertainty in the event
tree as shown in Figure 5.18 b). Such a high confidence of a “Poor” ALARP rating would
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indicate poor justification for proceeding with the risk reduction measure if all TRG
limits were already met prior to the implementation of this measure. However this is not
the case and so this evaluation would not normally enter into the decision process. It is
shown here to only demonstrate this type of output from DAMRAE-U.
The uncertainty distribution of benefit:cost ratio as obtained from the Type I
simulation shown in Figure 5.19.a indicates a value of 0.0007 for the 95th percentile of
natural variability and knowledge uncertainties. For the Type II simulation, benefit:cost
ratios vary from 0.0004 to 0.001 for the selected 95th percentile of natural variability and
knowledge uncertainty in the event tree shown in Figure 5.19.b.
Under the ALARP evaluation, the disproportionality ratio (R) is used as a
quantitative measure to justify the implementation of a risk reduction measure to reduce
the risk below the tolerable risk limit values.(6-8) The criterion of disproportionality ratio
can be applied in relation to the individual risk (IR), which is expressed as a probability
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of life-loss for an individual person. For simplicity in this paper we have conservatively
estimated IR as the total annual probability of failure (APF). The ALARP justification
ratings for this criterion (shown in Figure 5.20) are based on updated USACE guidance.
Based on these ratings, the risk reduction measure, as estimated for the Type I simulation,
has a 98.5% confidence level of poor justification (Figure 5.20). For Type II simulation,
this information is represented as confidence levels in ALARP justification ratings for
different percentile levels of the uncertainty included in the logic tree model. Figure 5.21
shows more than 94% confidence of poor justification for the risk reduction measure for
all the percentile levels of the logic tree uncertainty.

4. SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS
The deterministic version of DAMRAE is extended to include uncertainty
analysis. In addition to handling the uncertainty in the event tree variables, DAMRAE-U
introduces logic trees to address the knowledge uncertainty of the existing state of a dam
system on which the event tree model is dependent. Alternatively logic trees can be used
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(Type II simulation)
to represent all forms of knowledge uncertainty and not just the knowledge uncertainty of
the existing state of a dam system.
A logic tree-event tree form of risk model is presented to demonstrate the
DAMRAE-U concepts. For the hypothetical dam, a single logic tree branch is included in
the model, but in general, logic trees are not limited to just one branch as illustrated in the
example. The number of branch levels in a logic tree depends on the number of sources
of knowledge uncertainty that are planned to be included in the analysis, and the number
of branches in a branch level depends on whether a set of discrete branches or a
continuous distribution is used to represent the range of uncertainty.
The example risk model is demonstrated for both the aggregated Type I and
disaggregated Type II uncertainty analyses. The aggregated uncertainty analysis lumps
all sources of knowledge uncertainty that are included in the event tree risk model and
those associated with the logic tree (existing condition knowledge uncertainty in the
example in this paper) to provide estimates of the uncertainty in the risk estimates. In
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contrast, the disaggregated uncertainty analysis separates the contributions to overall
knowledge uncertainty in risk estimates into those associated with the event tree risk
model and those associated with the logic tree. Separating these contributions to
uncertainty in the output risk estimates can be useful for evaluating the degree to which
reducing the existing state uncertainty would increase the confidence in risk estimates,.
The results of the two types of simulations are presented in specific formats.
Cumulative probability distributions are generated to show knowledge uncertainty as
confidence levels on the risk analysis outputs, such as annualized risk estimates and costeffectiveness of risk reduction alternatives. The risk evaluation outcomes are presented in
terms of the estimated confidence with which tolerable risk and other guidelines are met.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
DAMRAE is proposed as a solution to overcome the limitations of commercial
software and other alternative approaches (e.g., spreadsheet models) that are commonly
used in the field of dam safety risk analysis. To develop the generalized framework of
DAMRAE, that is readily adaptable for a computational processing, several refinements
to traditional risk analysis modeling terminology are made. The concepts of Connectivity
and Pedigree matrices are introduced to quantify the user-drawn event tree structures
with proper accounting of interdependencies among the event tree branches. A generic
calculation of Common-Cause Adjustment (CCA) for the non-mutually exclusive failure
modes is implemented along with introducing the new concepts of SRP and consequence
freezing. Several new output presentation formats such as cumulative risk estimate vs.
initiating variable plots to analyze the increase of an incremental (annualized) risk
estimate as a function of initiating variable are introduced. An additional consideration is
given to the non-breach risk estimates in the risk modeling and new output formats such
as non-breach F-N and F-$ charts are included as standard risk analysis outputs. The key
features of DAMRAE can be summarized as follows:
a) DAMRAE includes a user-friendly graphical interface for the event tree
development and input assignment. Common interface options, such as add,
delete, and relocate branches, accompanied with advanced collapsed node
functionality provide easy and flexible event tree construction features.
b) Types of branches defined in DAMRAE to draw the event tree structure covers all
the possible events that are commonly used in the event tree modeling. Range of
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continuous variable (e.g., flood loading) can be handled using a continuous
branch type. Nested continuous variables, such as PGA-AEP loading and stageduration relationships for the earthquake event tree, can be included using
multiple continuous branches.
c) Event tree quantification is performed by DAMRAE to generate the risk estimates
in various forms including annual risk estimates (probability of dam failure and
expected values of life-loss and economic consequences) and graphical displays
such as charts for evaluating USACE tolerable risk guidelines.
d) For the risk reduction analysis, the existing risk analysis can be reiterated by
adding new run-cases to a DAMRAE project. For the new run-cases, existing
event tree models can be copied and modified to represent the specifications
pertaining to the proposed risk reduction measure.
e) In case of a risk analysis of risk reduction options, additional decision variables
such as Risk Reduction Benefits, Risk Reduction Cost, Benefit:Cost Ratio,
Adjusted Cost per Statistical Live Saved (ACSLS), and Disproportionality Ratio
(R) are also calculated.
DAMRAE supports the deterministic form of event tree analysis where the branch
probabilities and state values (branch inputs) assigned to different branches are either
fixed values or deterministic relationships. DAMRAE framework is extended in
DAMRAE-U to incorporate the uncertainty analysis for the event tree models. In
DAMRAE-U, Monte Carlo simulation based generic uncertainty propagation logic is
implemented with the consideration of correlations among uncertain variables. This
computational logic includes a new functionality of uncertainty separation for the logic
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tree and event tree form of risk models. Uncertainty about the existing state, on which the
event tree model is conditioned, can be defined in a separate logic tree model appended
before the event tree structure. A logic tree –event tree form of model can be simulated to
analyze the combined effect of the existing state uncertainty, and knowledge uncertainty
and natural variability in the event tree model. In the case where the separation of
existing state uncertainty and event tree knowledge uncertainty is required, disaggregated
uncertainty analysis option can be selected.
The computation logic also enables the simulations of risk reduction measures
and provides estimates of uncertainty distributions for the risk and risk reduction
estimates. When uncertainty analyses are conducted the evaluation against tolerable risk
limit guidelines is changed from a relatively straightforward assessment as to whether
risk estimates are above or below limit guidelines to an assessment of the degree of
confidence that the estimated risk is above or below a limit guideline. DAMRAE-U
automatically performs such assessment and attributes degrees of confidence with which
tolerable risk and other guidelines are met.
DAMRAE is continuously widening its user group and hence, there will be
always scope of improving the interface features and functionality as per the
requirements of the users. At the core calculation level, computational processing can be
enhanced with parallel processing and other advance techniques in computer
programming. From theoretical and conceptual design point of view, following are some
of the features which could be included to further improve the role of DAMRAE in dam
safety risk analysis a) Intervention sensitivity option for event trees can be included to assess the
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degrees to which the probabilities of successful interventions reduce the failure
risk estimates.
b) Database aspects of the program can be enhanced to support the uncertainty
analysis functionality with increased data storage capacity and parallel
simulations for risk reduction measures.
c) Capability for performing sensitivity and scenario analysis can be developed for
the uncertainty analysis version to identify the significant uncertain variables.
d) Batch simulation functionality with proper accounting of correlations among
different dam or levee segments can be included to support applications for long
dams or levees that requires multiple applications of DAMRAE to dam or levee
segments.
e) Facility for importing standard templates of dam safety risk models and adapting
them for application to a specific dam can be included.

.
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